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“… and in the history of antitrust this is indeed a landmark opinion.” Assistant 
Attorney General Joel Klein, Apr. 3, 2000,
1 regarding Judge Jackson’s 
“Conclusions of Law” in United States v. Microsoft.
2 
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Executive Summary  
 
Much has been said and written regarding the legal and economic merits of U.S. v. 
Microsoft and the practicality of antitrust in high technology industries.  The focus here is 
what this prominent case says about the role of economics in general, and in particular, 
“post-Chicago” approaches.  Is antitrust economics and law on a progressive path, pro-
ducing more refined analyses of industrial practices?  Or is the path more like that of a 
pendulum, with doctrines coming back in style that had once fallen out of fashion? 
 
U.S. v. Microsoft suggests that the path of antitrust may be cyclical rather than pro-
gressive.  The crux of the argument is that in U.S. v. Microsoft, the three aspects of an 
economically sound antitrust case—theory, evidence, and remedy— were largely inde-
pendent of, if not inconsistent with, each other.  Roughly speaking, the theory focused on 
monopolizing application platforms, the evidence spoke to monopolizing browser distri-
bution, and the remedy treated applications themselves as the competitive lynchpin.  The 
plaintiffs’ success at trial suggests, in contrast to the older aphorism that “hard cases 
make bad law,” that this “easy case” may be responsible for “bad law,” where an “easy 
case” is one where the victory at trial was so compelling and “bad law” refers to an ulti-
mately reduced role for economics as an antitrust policy guidepost.   
 
These observations need not imply that Microsoft’s conduct was benign.  Isolating 
the theory, evidence, and remedy from the case, one can construct three potential ration-
ales for finding Microsoft’s actions anticompetitive.  We also identify three additional 
stories based on tying with transaction costs, reputation-preserving predatory pricing, and 
intellectual property.  That none of these stories were told suggests that U.S. v. Microsoft 
signals a return to pre-Chicago antitrust.  Those preferring a less constraining role for 
economics in antitrust courts may agree with this assessment without finding it disagree-
able.  Moreover, there may be no better alternative—legislation or regulation need not 
lead to better outcomes.  It may offer small comfort to observe that antitrust is not the 
only policy area in which progress in economic theory may ironically lead to regress in 
its importance.      1
Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law? 
Antitrust Innovations or Missed Opportunities in United States v. Microsoft 
Timothy J. Brennan 
I.  Introduction 
A.  Context 
Much has been said and written regarding United States v. Microsoft. The most salient issue 
has been whether bringing an antitrust case against Microsoft was good or bad for competition in 
the computer industry and the economy.
3 A related, more general concern has been whether the 
time consuming and backward-looking nature of antitrust litigation renders it unsuitable as a 
means for controlling market power in high technology industries.
4  
The focus here is different. While we will have much to say about the economics pertaining 
to United States v. Microsoft, our purpose is not to criticize the plaintiff’s legal claims or strate-
gies. Through the trial stage, the legal strategy was a home run, with the district court both mak-
ing a strong finding of antitrust liability
5 and ordering the remedy the plaintiffs sought.
6 The 
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia recently upheld the judgment that Microsoft ille-
gally abused its monopoly position.
7 While it rejected the plaintiff’s proposed remedy, it did so 
on largely procedural grounds.
8 
We do not seek to resolve controversies about whether Microsoft’s conduct merited legal in-
tervention. We will introduce half a dozen economic theories of anticompetitive conduct that 
might warrant the imposition of an antitrust remedy against Microsoft. Those theories, however, 
serve to illustrate ways in which economic theory could have been applied in this case. We make 
no claims, by and large, that evidence adduced in the case, or that could have been obtained, 
                                                                 
3 DAVID EVANS ET AL., DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS: TWO OPPOSING VIEWS (2000). David Evans and co-
author Richard Schmalensee consulted for Microsoft in the antitrust case, with Schmalensee testifying as Micro-
soft’s economic expert. Co-author Franklin Fisher testified as the economic expert for the Department of Justice, 
while co-author Daniel Rubinfeld was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis in the Division 
during the case. Other significant publications on different sides of the issue include Robert Hahn, The Costs of 
Regulating Microsoft, 21 REGULATION 67 (1998); Steven Salop & Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic 
Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617 (1999); Ronald Cass & Keith Hylton, Pre-
serving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 8  GEO. M ASON  L. R EV. 1 (1999); 
STANLEY LIEBOWITZ & RICHARD MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS AND MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN 
HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999); George Bittlingmayer & Thomas Hazlett, DOS Kapital: Has Antitrust Action Against 
Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry, 55 J. FIN. E CON. 329 (2000); Howard Shelanski & J. Gregory 
Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001).  
4 See Posner, supra note 2, at 1. 
5 Microsoft VII, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35-51. 
6 United States v Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2000)(Microsoft VIII)(final judgment). For 
the remedy the plaintiffs sought, see Plaintiffs’ Proposed Final Judgment, Microsoft VIII (No. 98-1232), available 
at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4600/4639.pdf, (accessed Aug. 23, 2001).  
7 United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(Microsoft IX). 
8 Id. at 97-107.     2
would have lent these theories sufficient support to justify legal restrictions on Microsoft’s co n-
duct or changes in its corporate structure. 
Rather, our objective is to see what this prominent case says about the incentive and ability to 
employ economics in general, and in particular, so-called “post-Chicago” antitrust economics.
9 
We ask whether antitrust economics and law are on a progressive path, producing more refined 
analyses of industrial practices? Or, alternatively, is the path more like that of a pendulum, with 
doctrines coming back in style that had once fallen out of fashion?  
If the path is progressive, more sophisticated theories and better methods of empirical analy-
sis should lead to a more accurate sorting of practices that promote competition and consumer 
welfare from those that do not. As a result, post-Chicago economics would provide new insights 
and constraints on the direction of case law. On the other hand, if the path is cyclical, reviving 
the formerly available wide array of potential enforcement justifications, litigants may use new 
theoretical models as “quasi-evidence” to argue that a practice that could be bad under some 
conditions, is therefore likely to be bad in the case at hand. The antitrust courtroom, however, 
may not be an effective forum for resolving whether the conditions are present to infer that a par-
ticular practice is anticompetitive in a particular circumstance. Rather than improving antitrust 
practice, theoretical sophistication would ironically subvert the constraining role economics has 
taken in antitrust since the 1970s. Consequently, the post-Chicago approach ends up merely ra-
tionalizing a pre-Chicago approach, where economics carries less weight.  
United States v. Microsoft suggests that the path of antitrust may be cyclical rather than pro-
gressive. To paraphrase President Clinton’s famous line in his 1996 State of the Union speech, 
the case indicates that the era of big economics in antitrust is over.
10 The plaintiffs’ success at 
trial suggests, in contrast to the older aphorism that “hard cases make bad law,” that this “easy 
case” may be responsible for “bad law,” where an “easy case” is one where the victory at trial 
was so compelling. This case may encourage a throwback to the antitrust litigation style of ear-
lier years, which was less disciplined by a need to “cross the t’s” and “dot the i’s” of an eco-
nomically consistent story.  
In arguing that United States v. Microsoft signals a return to pre-Chicago antitrust, a case 
against Microsoft need not have been inappropriate on the economic merits. We will sketch out 
below half a dozen economic theories (some post-Chicago) potentially supporting antitrust-based 
limits on Microsoft’s conduct or structure, three of which are suggested by the course of the liti-
gation. Each of these theories implies a particular set of confirming evidence to be adduced and 
an appropriate remedy. But none of these theories came as a complete economic package in 
                                                                 
9 “Post-Chicago” economics is based on complicated models involving strategic behavior and imperfect informa-
tion, which allow for a wider range of possible outcomes than the relatively simple competitive and monopoly mod-
els characteristic of the “Chicago” school. This is discussed in slightly more detail in the text accompanying notes 
48-78 infra. These terms are standard in the antitrust vernacular. See Symposium, Post-Chicago Economics, 63 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 445 (1995).  
10 The original quote from President Clinton’s 1996 State of the Union address was “The era of big government 
is over.” President William J. Clinton, 1996 State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996),  available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/dpcs/sou96.htm, (accessed Aug.3, 2001).     3
United States v. Microsoft, with an implied set of evidence and remedy to match. The plaintiff’s 
success at trial, despite this shortcoming, supports the view that a legally compelling case did not 
require, and may well have been hampered by, the economic discipline necessary to construct 
one of these complete packages.  
Many, if not most, practitioners inclined toward activist antitrust policy might well agree that 
post-Chicago economics, as reflected in United States vs. Microsoft, promotes pre-Chicago anti-
trust. They surely do not applaud post-Chicago economics because they relish parsing out the 
complex mathematical nuances of sequential equilibrium models. Instead, the popularity of post-
Chicago economics rests on its ability to provide hypothetical situations in which practices 
largely exonerated by Chicago-style antitrust could be deleterious. Consequently, whether one 
concludes that post-Chicago economics is good or bad likely depends in large measure on 
whether one believes that economic constraints on antitrust jurisprudence—specifically, the Chi-
cago school perspective regarding the effectiveness of competition and the largely benign nature 
of vertical integration and restraints—led to worse or better antitrust policies than those which 
preceded them. 
B.  The cinematic version: Austin Powers 
A cinematic analogy may help set the scene. A recent film, Antitrust, might seem  to be a 
candidate in light of its title and plot involving a software company that will “stop at nothing to 
win.”
11 A better film to represent United States v. Microsoft, however, might be the next install-
ment of the Austin Powers comedies. In these films,  Austin Powers, a secret agent from the 
1960s, is brought out of frozen suspended animation in the late 1990s to prevent the malevolent 
Dr. Evil from “hatching a . . . diabolical scheme to annihilate the world.”
12  
While interest in United States v. Microsoft has little to do with any comedic appeal, Austin 
Powers is analogous, in that the case called for thawing out 1960s antitrust to fight a “Dr. Evil” 
in the guise of Microsoft and its co-founder and (then) chief executive officer, Bill Gates. Leav-
ing aside the specific analogy, this view of the case is not unique. Irwin Stelzer has recently 
opened a commentary on the case with the following analysis: 
Despite all [of] the controversy it has already and will in the future engender, the Micro-
soft case is nothing more than an unremarkable step down a well-trodden path to the 
preservation of a competitive economy—unremarkable because it merely presents an ex-
ample of a traditional antitrust violation.
13  
                                                                 
11 ANTITRUST  synopsis, official site from MGM, at http://www.antitrustthemovie.com/synopsis.html (accessed 
May 17, 2001). 
12  AUSTIN  POWERS: T HE  SPY  WHO  SHAGGED  ME story, official site from NewLine Films,  at 
http://www.austinpowers.com/notes/story.html (accessed May 17, 2001). 
13 Irwin M. Stelzer, Microsoft and the Antitrust Laws: Old Fashioned Problems and a New Economy Company, 
AEI-BROOKINGS  JOINT  CENTER  FOR  REGULATORY  STUDIES  POLICY  MATTERS  01-09,  March, 2001,  at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/policy/policy_01_09.asp (accessed May 17, 2001).     4
Stelzer goes on to observe that one reason the case has received so much attention is because 
“the flamboyant and brilliant David Boies [the lead attorney hired by the Justice Department] 
skillfully seduced the media into playing the story as a gladiatorial battle between good (him) 
and evil (Gates).”
14  
 The Austin Powers analogy serves to distinguish the argument supported by this Article 
from other possible arguments about the relationship of economics to antitrust, and about the 
case in particular. Specifically, the “plot” of this installment in the cinema series would leave 
open the following possibilities that are not at issue in this Article.  
•  The government made an excellent tactical move by defrosting Austin Powers. Although 
the legal process has yet to run its course, the “slam dunk” success at trial suggests that 
the plaintiffs’ legal strategy was, in terms of accomplishing their goals, brilliantly con-
ceived and executed. 
•  Austin Powers was the most effective opponent for getting Dr. Evil. As Stelzer argues and 
the courts have found so far, Microsoft’s conduct violated the antitrust laws, as conven-
tionally interpreted. Our thesis here depends in part on showing that there are serious ten-
sions, if not outright inconsistencies, within the economics of the case and the judge’s de-
cisions.
15 But such inconsistencies do not rule out the possibility that United States v. Mi-
crosoft makes for a coherent story within existing antitrust law. 
•  Dr. Evil really is evil (and didn’t go away after the first movie). We do not claim here 
that Microsoft’s conduct has been unfailingly benign and any case against it would be 
misguided. Criticizing this case against Microsoft does not imply a criticism of any case 
that might have been brought. To support the assertion that this case is problematic on 
economic grounds, we will briefly outline half a dozen potential economic cases—
theories, potential fact patterns, and implied relief—that the plaintiffs might have brought 
against Microsoft. Just as Austin Powers failed to quash Dr. Evil in the first installment 
of the series, here the “first movie” was the first consent decree obtained by the Justice 
Department against Microsoft in 1995,
16 which did not prevent the actions leading to the 
Microsoft case we are examining here. 
•  Austin Powers might be a fascinating “international man of mystery.” The quoted 
phrase, the subtitle of the first Austin Powers movie, indicates that the old doctrines are 
worthy research subjects for academic economists interested in exploring noncooperative 
game theoretic models of corporate behavior. Such strategic considerations underpin 
some alternative cases the plaintiffs could have brought against Microsoft. Whether this 
theoretical potential is or can be realized in practical antitrust contexts, for better or 
worse, is our primary concern. 
                                                                 
14 Id. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 179-237. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 79-88.     5
•  More conventional methods may still be employed against lesser villains. Even if “the era 
of big economics in antitrust is over,” “small” but highly complex economics will have a 
role in ascertaining pertinent facts. The most prominent example would be novel econo-
metric techniques for predicting unilateral effects in mergers between suppliers of differ-
entiated substitutes.
17 
If this long list of issues is not what we are challenging, what are we asking here? Continuing 
the cinematic analogy, the foremost question is whether Austin Powers is back to stay. Does 
United States v. Microsoft signal a return to antitrust traditions of the 1960s? If Austin Powers is 
coming back to stay as a crime fighter, will he displace the tools and tactics that developed in his 
absence? Finally, did “science gone mad” lead to Austin Powers? Have advances in economic 
theorizing that led to the creative construction of dozens of models of industry behavior ironi-
cally diminished the ability of economics to influence the design and outcome of antitrust cases?  
C.  Summary of the argument 
We begin with a very brief review of the salient aspects of antitrust law, economics and pol-
icy history to clarify the problem. To set the stage, we provide a brief background of the context 
for the litigation in United States v. Microsoft. This includes a timeline of prior salient develop-
ment in Microsoft’s corporate history and its dealings with the Department of Justice, as well as 
the events in the present case. We summarize the major points in the complaint and Microsoft’s 
defense.  
In economic terms, an ideal antitrust case should have three interrelated components: a the-
ory of how consumers are harmed by the conduct at issue, which implies a body of confirming 
evidence, and if confirmed, which implies a remedy for the problem. An analysis of whether 
these three components followed this logical path in United States v. Microsoft would test the 
significance of economic theory in the construction of the case. Focusing on the plaintiff’s com-
plaint in filing the case,
18 the trial court’s conclusions of law,
19 and the plaintiffs’ brief in support 
of the remedy,
20 we identify these three components in United States v Microsoft as follows: 
                                                                 
17 For a useful review of recent developments in antitrust econometrics, see Jonathan Baker & Daniel Rubinfeld, 
Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 AM. J.L. & ECON. REV. 386 (1999). 
18 Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999)(Microsoft VI)(No. 98-
1232)(findings of fact), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm. Some supporting the Justice 
Department’s case have suggested to me that more recent documents, e.g., the plaintiff’s brief opposing Microsoft’s 
appeal of the decision, would provide more appropriate background. Brief for Appellees United States and the State 
Plaintiffs, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(Microsoft IX)(Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7200/7230.pdf (accessed Aug. 23, 2001). For a number of reasons, I 
disagree. The only reason to look at later briefs would be if, during the course of trial, the plaintiffs changed the evi-
dence upon which they planned to rely. There is no indication, however, that the positions of the parties changed in 
any significant way. Without such a change, one would infer that any lack of economic fit between the theory and 
evidence at the start likely persisted.  
Most important, as public agencies as well as litigators, the plaintiffs in this case had an obligation to present a 
clear case as soon as possible. The ultimate purpose of antitrust prosecutions is to deter anticompetitive conduct. 
Deterrence will be weakened, if not eliminated, if cases are drawn so loosely that firms come to believe that antitrust 
authorities will not provide pre-trial notice of what they regard as problematic and why. Even if the plaintiffs’ briefs     6
•  Theory: Microsoft developed and promoted Internet Explorer (“IE,” its web browser) and 
Windows-specific Java (an application that allows personal computers to run web-
delivered programs) to protect its monopoly in operating systems necessary to run any 
applications.
21  
•  Evidence: Microsoft has a monopoly in operating systems for Intel-based personal com-
puters (PCs).
22 It engaged in repeated conduct to exclude Netscape, the primary competi-
tor to IE, primarily through exclusionary contracts with PC manufacturers and Internet 
service providers.
23 As the case progressed, the plaintiffs added a specific claim that free 
distribution of IE was predatory.
24  
•  Remedy: The plaintiffs recommended and the trial court adopted a remedy to separate 
Microsoft into two companies, one that would provide operating systems, and another 
that would provide all other applications, including word processing, spreadsheet, and 
presentation software, as well as IE.
25 
These three aspects of the case are largely independent of if not inconsistent with each other. 
Each could form part of the core of an economically sound case, but only if each was accompa-
nied by two alternative partners in the “theory-evidence-remedy” triangle. The most difficult po-
tential case to construct is to find evidence and remedy partners for the theory of the case.
26 The 
evidence should first delineate a different marke t— future application platforms, including those 
supporting web-resident programs—than that identified by the plaintiffs, the market for operat-
ing systems for Intel-based PCs. It should then show that Microsoft and the combination of “Net-
scape + Java” were the two most likely entrants into that future market. Had that been done, the 
appropriate remedy would be to bite a distasteful bullet. The plaintiffs could have asked the court 
to prevent Microsoft, as an incumbent monopolist, from providing new products or product fea-
tures, to preserve the possibility that providers of those products or features today would survive 
to compete in that future platform market. Neither this evidence nor this remedy was present.  
Having considered all of the arguments, testimony, and evidence in detail, the trial judge 
might have resolved possible inconsistencies between the theory and the evidence. (The pro-
posed remedy had yet to be considered, and appears to have been generally unanticipated at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
on appeal substantively differed from the complaint, the plaintiffs should be held accountable on the latter in evalu-
ating the role of economics (as opposed to other salient legal factors) in the construction of the case. 
19 Microsoft VII, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35. 
20 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 
2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000)(Microsoft VIII)(No. 98-1232)(final judgment),  available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4600/4640.htm (accessed Aug. 15, 2001). 
21 Complaint ¶¶ 4-9, Microsoft VI (No. 98-1232).  
22 Id. at ¶¶ 54, 58. 
23 Id. at ¶¶ 75-86, 93-102.  
24 Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Findings of Fact ¶¶ 295-317.3.i,  Microsoft VI (No. 98-1232),  available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2600/2613.htm (accessed Aug. 23, 2001). 
25 Plaintiff’s Proposed Final Judgment at 2-3, Microsoft VIII (No. 98-1232); Microsoft VIII, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
26 See infra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.     7
time the Conclusions of Law were issued.) Instead, the trial judge’s Conclusions of Law
27 con-
tain at least three economic tensions, if not contradictions, in findings applying the Sherman Act 
§ 1 and § 2.
28 These tensions could have been byproducts of the absence of a clear economic 
story. The Court of Appeals decision upholding the trial court in part and rejecting it in part indi-
rectly addressed some of these tensions, but still left them largely unresolved.
29 
An alternative theory based on monopolization of browser distribution, and a remedy that 
would reduce the scope of exclusive browser contracts with computer manufacturers and Internet 
service providers, would better fit the evidence as presented.
30 The vertical divestiture remedy 
adopted by the trial judge in United States v. Microsoft would fit a theory that the crucial m o-
nopoly Microsoft held was not over the operating system, but over its applications, particularly 
its Word word-processing application and its Office suite of word-processing, spreadsheet, and 
presentation software.
31 Such a case may be factually supportable, but it was not the case that 
was litigated.
32 Although “application lock-in,” i.e., reluctance to switch operating systems ab-
sent assurance that one’s applications will continue to work, is important in explaining why entry 
into operating systems is difficult, it does not explain why the applications Microsoft owns were 
crucial. The proposed “vertical divestiture,” of Microsoft has been analogized to the facially 
similar relief in the previous major monopolization case, United States v. AT&T, but the two 
cases could hardly be less similar.
33  
To voice these criticisms is not to conclude that Microsoft’s conduct increased rather than re-
duced consumer welfare. As discussed above, isolating the theory, evidence, and remedy from 
the case as brought allows us to construct three potential rationales for finding Microsoft’s ac-
tions anticompetitive. We identify three additional such stories based on tying in the presence of 
transaction costs,
34 reputational theories of predation,
35 and intellectual property definitions.
36 
With appropriate evidence, these stories could each warrant remedies against Microsoft other 
than those that the district court proposed. They include mandatory provision of application pro-
gram interfaces at “reasonable” prices, requiring Bill Gates to divest his interests in Microsoft, or 
giving independent firms the rights to see and use the source code for the Windows operating 
system. Not all such stories implicate Microsoft; in particular, we discuss how contentions that 
operating system markets are prone to “tipping” in favor of a single monopolist may make stra-
tegic entry deterrence more difficult, not less. 
That none of these stories were told and that substantial inconsistencies persisted in a case 
that, subject to appeals, was a spectacular success for the plaintiffs, suggests that when the litiga-
                                                                 
27 See Microsoft VII, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 34. 
28 15 U.S.C. §1, 2 (1994); see infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.  
31 See infra notes 230-37 and accompanying text. 
32 Id. 
33 See infra notes 238-53 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.     8
tion heat is on, attorneys may want economists in the kitchen. It may be easier to apply tradi-
tional precedents than to support innovative economic theories. Legal settings may not be condu-
cive to a careful assessment of the assumptions that inherently situation-specific post-Chicago 
theories require.  
We briefly examine arguments that the proper way to view Microsoft’s antitrust liability is in 
holistic or intentional terms.
37 A holistic case is one in which Microsoft’s liability depends not on 
any single event, but on a pattern of conduct revealed by a course of events. A holistic perspec-
tive may well have played a significant role in establishing Microsoft’s legal culpability, but it 
would not complement an economic approach inherently more analytical and less impression-
istic. The Court of Appeals similarly found that a holistic view of the case added nothing of con-
sequence beyond the culpability associated with each individual allegation.
38 Intent may be l e-
gally salient, but it does not fit well with an economic perspective. Economics offers reasons for 
incorporating intent to distinguish between torts and crimes, but those reasons do not seem par-
ticularly pertinent to antitrust.
39 
Difficulties in unifying the theory, evidence, and remedy into a single whole, and the failure 
to incorporate other potential strategic economic theories, suggest that United States v. Microsoft 
points antitrust “back to the future” or, perhaps more accurately, “ahead to the past.” As noted 
above, one can agree with this assessment without finding it disagreeable. Even if one objects to 
a conclusion that the nature of antitrust litigation limits the amount of economic sophistication 
one can expect, there remains a question of whether there is any practical alternative. Having an-
titrust courts in which both sides can invoke situationally-specific economic theories that prove 
difficult to distinguish and thus cancel each other out, may be no better than attempting to settle 
competition issues through legislation or regulation. It may offer small comfort to observe that 
antitrust is not the only policy area in which progress in economic theory may lead to regress in 
its importance.
40 
II.  Background: antitrust law and economics 
A.  Antitrust law primer 
The argument that the course of a particular case may signify trends in antitrust practice 
might surprise those unfamiliar with antitrust. They might expect an intricate statutory regime 
that defines violations with considerable specificity. Such statutory specificity would presumably 
define which kinds of arguments count in antitrust cases—whether economic or otherwise. Un-
der such a regime, the notion of “trends” or “cycles” in policy practice, absent passage of new 
statutes, would seem out of place. 
                                                                 
37 See infra notes 303-22 and accompanying text. 
38 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(Microsoft IX). 
39 See infra notes 313-19 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 326-33 and accompanying text.     9
Those with experience in antitrust know better. Except for technical clauses regarding penal-
ties, the entire body of codified antitrust laws relevant to United States v. Microsoft may be 
found in §1 of the Sherman Act on “restraints of trade,”  
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.
41 
and Sherman §2, on “monopolization,”  
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
42  
That’s it. The antitrust laws in the U.S. are primarily judge-made, rather than defined by stat-
ute.
43 The enormous precedential effect of decisions made through litigation makes antitrust law 
malleable, allowing it to remain applicable as the economy changes around them. 
Competition law in the U.S. might not look much different if the relevant statutes said only 
“be good.” There is, however, one specific and, perhaps to those not antitrust aficionados, unex-
pected substantive limitation on these laws. In specifying that bad acts are associated either with 
agreements to restrain trade or with acting to acquire a monopoly, the laws neither make it ille-
gal to possess a monopoly nor limit a monopolist’s ability to charge whatever price the market 
will bear.
44 Microsoft did not and could not invite antitrust scrutiny simply because of the price it 
charged for its Windows operating systems, even if it were uncontested that it had a monopoly 
over operating systems. In this case, as in others, a firm runs a greater risk of running afoul of the 
antitrust laws by setting a price too low and thereby acquiring a virtual monopoly in its market, 
than in keeping its price high and making it easier for competitors to survive.  
B.  Antitrust’s economic and policy history 
The combined historical course of antitrust economics and jurisprudence, with an unavoid-
able time lag for academic developments to reach the courtroom, may be divided into three 
stages. The first, taking up most of the first seventy-five years of antitrust, might be called im-
                                                                 
41 15 U.S.C. §1 (1994) 
42 15 U.S.C. §2 (1994). 
43 Also like common law, most antitrust cases (although not United States v. Microsoft) are brought by private 
parties motivated by redressing their own grievances rather than setting public policy. See William J. Baumol & 
Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J. L. E CON. 247 (1985), Steven Salop & Lawrence 
White,  Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: N EW 
EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING (L. White ed. 1988).  
44 ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 93, 195 (1994) (monopoliza-
tion requires an illegally obtained monopoly, and a single firm cannot conspire alone to restrain trade, citing Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)). Note that even this substantive limitation is ex-
pressed in the case law, and perhaps even it is vulnerable, despite the use of the term “monopolization” rather than 
“having a monopoly” in section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1994).     10
pressionistic. During that era markets and competition were seen as fragile, sensitive to the level 
of market concentration. Following this perception of fragility, profits from monopoly would en-
courage successful monopolization and collusion, manifested tacitly as well as overtly. This im-
pressionistic view supported beliefs that firms could, through predatory pricing, tying, and exclu-
sive agreements, leverage a monopoly in one market to monopolize other markets.  
This impressionistic disposition led to a populist view that the goal of antitrust was to maxi-
mize independence in the organization of industries. Within markets, the enforcement objective 
was to minimize concentration by taking a strict approach regarding both mergers and practices 
by large firms that might put smaller enterprises out of business. The characterizing phrase later 
voiced critically in the antitrust community was “protecting competition by protecting competi-
tors.” This disposition applied to vertical as well as horizontal integration, 
45 and to vertical re-
straints as well as monopolistic or collusive practices that reduced independent discretion among 
competitors.
46 Opposition to vertical restraints was bolstered by their facially similar resem-
blance to decidedly anticompetitive horizontal practices, e.g. in holding that manufacturer-
imposed retail prices were akin to agreements among competitors to fix prices.
47.  
Beginning in the late 1950s and 1960s within academia, and spreading to antitrust practice in 
the 1970s, this impressionistic view was challenged by an economic perspective that rejected the 
premise that markets and competition were inherently fragile.
48 This perspective came to be 
known as the “Chicago school,” because economists at the University of Chicago were promi-
nent (but by no means alone) in promoting it. Among the more prominent academic articles es-







54 wrote influential books collecting and summarizing these ideas for the general anti-
trust audience. Perhaps the bellwether decision was Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
                                                                 
45 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (banning a cab manufacturer from forcing its taxi 
service subsidiary to purchase its cabs). 
46 DAVID KASERMAN & JOHN MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGU-
LATION 372 (1995); see also Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (affirming a 
decree enjoining exclusive gasoline contracts to supply gasoline and automobile parts to independent dealers); 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (prohibiting grants of exclusive territories to 
retail Schwinn bicycles). 
47 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) (prohibiting manufacturer of patent 
medicines from fixing retail prices); Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 46, at 366. 
48 See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text. 
49 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Y ALE L.J. 19 (1957) (arguing that 
tying cannot be used to create additional market power through leveraging). 
50 John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. E CON 137 (1958) (arguing that 
Standard Oil did not achieve market power through predation). 
51 Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3 J.L. E CON. 86 (1960) (arguing that resale price 
maintenance provides incentives to provide point-of-sale service, and would otherwise reduce a monopolist’s prof-
its). 
52 Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARN-
ING 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al., eds., 1974) (arguing that empirical correlation between market concentration 
and profits reflect efficiencies of large firms, not anticompetitive pricing). 
53 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
54 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).     11
Inc.,
55 which eliminated per se illegality for non-price vertical restraints.
56 In the policy arena, 
the Chicago school perspective reached an apex under William Baxter as Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust in the Department of Justice from 1981-1983.
57  
The Chicago school perspective posited that markets could take care of themselves in all but 
a limited set of circumstances.
58 Explicit collusive agreements would warrant prosecution. Tacit 
collusion, however, did not warrant prosecution, because the inability of firms to resist the incen-
tive to cheat on any informal, unenforceable agreement made such agreements unsustainable. 
Threat of entry not only imposed competitive pressures to hold prices down, but it also made 
threats to charge “predatory” below-cost prices not credible, because entry would prevent them 
from recouping losses by raising prices later.
59  
This same propensity for firms to enter in response to high prices implied that only a few 
firms were necessary to achieve competitive outcomes in a market, reducing concern about 
mergers unless market concentration became quite high.
60 The reduced need to limit concentra-
tion per se in order to preserve a large number of independent actors led to the view that protect-
ing small competitors forced consumers to pay high prices for the sole purpose of keeping oth-
erwise inefficient enterprises afloat.
61 “Protecting competitors by protecting competition” came 
to be replaced in the antitrust vernacular by what some have called the “First Theorem of Anti-
trust: If a competitor complains about a merger or practice, it must be good.”
62  
If competition is, by definition, a process that takes place among firms within a market, the 
Chicago perspective implies that relationships that reach across markets—vertical integration, 
tying, vertical restraints, exclusionary contracts—would not reduce competition. These tactics 
are used as a means to achieve operational efficiencies that ultimately reduce costs and price, in-
crease product quality, or provide consumers with better information.
63 Even if a firm engaging 
in these practices is a monopolist, its monopoly already harms consumers as much as possible, 
leaving nothing to be gained through “leverage” or “foreclosure.”
64 Unless regulation limits the 
ability of such a firm to set monopoly prices in the first place, vertical integration or restraints 
                                                                 
55 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
56 Id. at 57-59. 
57 Among Baxter’s accomplishments during this time at the Division was the issuance of the economics-based 
Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines, dropping the government’s (then) thirteen year old monopoli-
zation case against IBM. JOHN MCGEE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 473-76 (1988).  
58 See generally BORK, supra note 54. 
59 MCGEE, supra note 57, at 200-02. 
60 DEMSETZ, supra note 52 at 167.  
61 William Baxter has called this aspect of antitrust an “excise tax we levy on consumers . . . to subsidize the free 
spirit and lifestyle of middle-class would-be entrepreneurs.” INDUSTRIAL  CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 
111-12 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al., eds., 1974). 
62 I first heard this from a colleague, Bruce Snapp, when we both worked as economists in the Antitrust Division 
during the 1980s. 
63 KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 46, at 334-63. 
64 BORK, supra note 54, at 229.     12
have no predictably harmful incremental effect.
65 Aggressive antitrust policy that blocked any-
thing but explicit collusion and the most egregious mergers would do more harm than good.  
In the last twenty years, antitrust economics has changed from the Chicago school’s small set 
of relatively general and simple theories to a wider range of more complex, situation-specific 
strategic interactions—“post-Chicago” economics.
66 The latter, grounded in non-cooperative 
game theory,
67 is characterized by a multitude of models relying on differing assumptions 
regarding the instruments firms c hoose to maximize profits (e.g., capacity, output, prices), 
information asymmetries, institution-specific commitment abilities, and the timing of 
interactions among actual and potential entrants.
68 Adding all of these dimensions reopens 
possible antitrust doors that the simpler Chicago perspective had closed.  
Research into these questions has been extensive. Important articles include those by Aghion 
and Bolton,
69 Whinston,
70 Ordover et al.,
71 Rasmusen et al.,
72 and Riordan and Salop.
73 Tirole
74 
and Schmalensee and Willig
75 provided very useful compendiums of these and many other mod-
els. The case signaling a move away from the Chicago view to the post-Chicago environment 
was Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,
76 in which the Supreme Court recog-
nized that imperfect information could create a relevant market in servicing Kodak copiers. 
77 A 
Chicago analysis would have rejected such a brand-specific market, finding that servicing is 
simply part of the copier services market in which all brands co mpete.  
                                                                 
65 We return to this specific point below in comparing the justifications for the vertical divestiture in United 
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), to that proposed by the plaintiffs and trial judge (vacated and re-
manded by the Court of Appeals) in United States v. Microsoft. See infra notes 238-53 and accompanying text. 
66 See M. Sean Royall, Editor’s Note, Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 A NTITRUST L.J. 445 (1995). 
67 Non-cooperative game theory comprises formal mathematical models of what happens in settings where inter-
acting players adopt strategies to promote their self interest based on what they know or reasonably believe to be the 
choices made by others. A key feature of noncooperative games is that the participants cannot make binding com-
mitments to each other. ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 18 (1994).  
68 See infra notes 68-78. 
69 Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987) (arguing 
that contracts where a customer who switches to an entrant has to compensate incumbent for doing so can bar more 
efficient entry if the entrant’s costs are not known by the incumbent and customer prior to entry.)  
70 Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion , 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990)(noting that a mo-
nopolist makes credible a commitment to sell at predatory prices in a second market by foregoing monopoly profits 
if it fails to sell in the second market, by tying sales in the latter to sales in the former). 
71 Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. E CON. R EV. 127 (1990)(arguing that if 
vertical integration makes credible a seller’s commitment not to sell to a buyer, the buyer’s competitor may have an 
incentive to merge with an upstream seller in order to raise prices). 
72 Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991)(arguing that buyers may sign con-
tracts giving a firm a monopoly over the entire market if buyers are too small to support individual sellers and each 
expects the others to sign such contracts). 
73 Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTI-
TRUST L. J. 513 (1995)(offering a framework for antitrust analysis of vertical mergers and rejecting Chicago pre-
sumption that vertical mergers are generally benign). 
74 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). 
75 RICHARD SCHMALENSEE & ROBERT WILLIG, THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1989). 
76 504 U.S. 451 (1992). For a useful critique of this decision, see Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Wel-
fare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (1995). 
77 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-76.     13
Injecting game theory into neoclassical economics has transformed the economics of indus-
trial organization. Chicago school industrial organization resembled a hammock suspended be-
tween one tree of approximately perfect competition and another of monopoly. Industries featur-
ing oligopoly and product differentiation rested uncomfortably in the middle. The game theory 
revolution changed that largely by expanding the set of well-defined models from two—
competition and monopoly—to an unlimited number, exploiting the various potential specifica-
tions of timing, strategic variables, commitments, and information. The standard competitive 
model itself became just a special case of a Nash equilibrium of a game in which firms set prices 
simultaneously.
78 
But raising these possibilities comes at the cost of making specific theories less robust. 
Whether a practice (tying, vertical integration) enhances or reduces consumer welfare depends, 
often crucially, on conjectures regarding how the industry in question works.
79 Do firms choose 
capacity, output, or price? Do they choose some variables at one time and others at a later time? 
Do they make choices knowing what the other has done, do they choose in ignorance, or do 
some get to choose with more knowledge than others? Perhaps most important are the conditions 
in which one firm can convince its competitors or customers that its commitments to charge 
predatory prices, refuse to deal with competitors, or insist on exclusivity from customers, are 
credible. 
Game-theory-based, post-Chicago revolution has two possible implications for antitrust prac-
tice. Ideally, this revolution would lead to more refined analyses, which would begin with the 
Chicago perspective, and then explain exactly how informational and strategic considerations 
lead to more accurate determinations of whether a given practice is good or bad for consumers 
and the economy. A second possibility is that post-Chicago theories lead to less refined analyses. 
                                                                 
78 The “Nash equilibrium” concept, developed by the mathematician John Nash, essentially says in this context 
that each firm will make choices that maximize its profits given the choices others have made. See John Nash, Non-
Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951); TIROLE, supra note 74 at 427.  
A variety of complicating refinements should be kept in mind. If firms act simultaneously—by definition, not 
knowing what one another does—a Nash equilibrium implies that once each observes what others do, it would not 
change its own behavior. In single-play games, the firm has no opportunity to retrace its steps, thus there is no force, 
akin to supply-demand imbalances in competitive markets, that leads firms to Nash equilibria. This is particularly 
problematic in games where there can be multiple Nash equilibria. If the firms replay the game indefinitely, the 
number of Nash equilibria typically becomes so large that predicting specific outcomes—collusion, competition, and 
anything in between—becomes impossible.  
When firms make choices sequentially, some Nash equilibria may become ineligible. While they may represent 
optimal choices if a firm can commit to them in advance, the choices along that path may not be profitable to carry 
out in the middle of the game. A predatory price may be credible with an up-front commitment, but it fails in that if 
entry takes place, the incumbent will find it unprofitable to charge a predatory price. Knowing that, the entrant will 
not find the threat credible. 
Finally, the most complex refinement is that if information is imperfect, Nash equilibria can be highly sensitive 
to the initial assumptions about what firms infer from moves the others make. Those conjectures may depend on 
what a firm would infer had others made choices different than the ones they chose in equilibrium. These “out of 
equilibrium” beliefs can never be updated or refuted, in that the choices on which they are based never arise. Thus, 
the number of outcomes that can take place in such models can be virtually unlimited. Predictions can depend on 
conjectures regarding what expectations are reasonable a priori.  
79 TIROLE, supra note 73; SCHMALENSEE & WILLIG, supra note 74.      14
Its theories may become a kind of “quasi-evidence,” in that if a practice could be harmful in 
some setting, it could be harmful in the case at hand. A “quasi-evidential” role could displace the 
simpler Chicago school approach, without offering any analytical discipline to replace it.
80 Eco-
nomics becomes little more than a litigation tax—each side must have one, but their stories can-
cel each other out.  
The fundamental questions here concern what United States v. Microsoft says about whether 
one of these possible implications may be true. Does the post-Chicago revolution signal more 
and better refinements of economics in antitrust, applying the post-Chicago models? Or does it 
signal a reversion to a “pre-Chicago” approach, in which the economic analysis serves largely to 
support impressions rather than constrain litigation?  
III.  Background: the industry and the case 
A.  The MS-DOS case 
Microsoft (MS) began its rise to prominence in 1981 with its introduction of MS-DOS, the 
basic operating system (OS) for the IBM personal computer (PC) and subsequent “clones” based 
on Intel processors.
81 Throughout the 1980s, MS-DOS was the dominant operating system in the 
personal computer industry.
82 Apple, originally in its Apple II and III computer series and later 
with the Macintosh introduced in 1984, offered an incompatible hardware-software package. 
While Apple systems could not run MS-DOS and IBM-compatible PCs could not run Apple’s 
operating system, Microsoft became the leading applications provider for Macintosh com-
puters.
83  
                                                                 
80 See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert, 34 AKRON 
L. REV. 795 (2001) (arguing that post-Chicago economics offers models on both sides of an issue and is thus unable 
to contribute any useful insight in antitrust litigation). 
81 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 ¶6, 13 (D.D.C. 1999) (Microsoft VI) (findings of fact). 
The “D” in MS-DOS stands for “disk,” referring to the OS’s role in writing and reading data on a floppy disk drive. 
82 Complaint at ¶8, 9, 15, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995) (Microsoft I) (No. 94-
1564), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0000/0046.htm, (accessed Aug. 15, 2001). An “operating sys-
tem” provides the internal instructions that tell a computer how to find, store, manipulate and display information by 
communicating between its internal temporary memory, internal storage devices, external data sources, display 
screens, printers, modems, and other devices. Id. at ¶ 6. It provides the instruction set, known as “applications pro-
gram interfaces” or APIs, that those who write programs to do specific tasks—word processing, spreadsheets, calen-
dars, email, web browsing, and games—use to get the PC to carry out the desired tasks. An API is a software in-
struction in which an applications program can tell the operating system to perform a particular function. United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71 (D.D.C. 2000) (Microsoft VIII) (final judgment). Examples include 
showing a character in a window, inserting or extracting data from random access memo ry or a hard drive, or dis-
playing a box to give the user a choice of options.  See  James Gleick, Making Microsoft Safe for Capitalism, THE 
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 5, 1995, at 56-57. Programs written to run on one operating system generally cannot 
run on another system. They must either be rewritten to call on different APIs or use typically slow and cumbersome 
simulation programs that, for example, get a Macintosh to “pretend” that it is an Intel-based PC.  
83 David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Be Nice to Your Rivals: How the Government is Selling an Antitrust 
Case Without Consumer Harm in United States v. Microsoft, in EVANS ET AL., supra note 3, at 69.     15
Microsoft’s next major contribution to operating systems came with its icon-based graphic- 
user interface, Windows.
84 The most successful versions, Windows 3.0 and 3.1, were introduced 
respectively in 1990 and 1992.
85 During this period, the Federal Trade Commission commenced 
an investigation of Microsoft’s alleged exclusion of competitors to MS-DOS and independent 
application developers. After the five-member FTC deadlocked twice, voting 2 -2 (with one 
recused) on whether to proceed, the investigation was handed to the Department of Justice’s An-
titrust Division in 1993.
86  
The Division’s investigation led to a settlement in 1994 with a consent decree containing two 
key provisions.
87 The first provision ended Microsoft’s practice of entering into “per processor” 
contracts, in which computer manufacturers (OEMs, for “original equipment manufacturers”) 
would pay Microsoft a fee based on how many computers they made, rather than how many ac-
tually came with MS-DOS.
88 Under such contracts, an OEM would bear a marginal cost of zero 
for including MS-DOS on a PC, discouraging it from supplying PCs with either no operating 
system or with a competitor’s operating system included.
89 
The second key provision turned out to be crucial for what was to come, and thus is worth 
quoting:  
Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the terms of that agree-
ment are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon: (i) the licensing of any other Covered 
Product, Operating System Software product or other product (provided, however, that 
this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from develop-
ing integrated products); or (ii) the OEM not licensing, purchasing, using or distributing 
any non-Microsoft product.
90 
                                                                 
84 Complaint at ¶ 9, Microsoft I (No. 94-1564). 
85 Stan Liebowitz, Windows and the “Applications Barrier to Entry”: Fact or Fantasy?, On Point Policy Brief, 
Competitive Enterprise Institute, n. 4 (Jan. 19, 2000), available at http://www.cei.org/OnPointReader.asp?ID=909, 
accessed Aug. 20, 2001. 
86 Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. at 321. 
87  United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 94-1561, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20533 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995) (Micro-
soft II). In February of 1995, the district court judge discarded the decree under the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) 
(1994), at the request of a brief filed on behalf of independent software developers, on the grounds that the decree 
did not address allegations that Microsoft favored its own applications developers. Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. at 328-
29, 338. The Division and Microsoft jointly appealed this decision, claiming that the Tunney Act gives a judge au-
thority to reject a decree only if the relief fails to address the alleged violation, not because the Department of Justice 
failed to cite a different set of violations. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court in June 1995.  United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d. 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Microsoft IV). 
88 Microsoft II, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20533, at *8. 
89 Assuming per-processor contracts covered the PC industry, their effect would be to give Microsoft the power 
to raise the prices of PCs by the MS-DOS or Windows license fee, while giving OEMs free access at the margin to 
install its operating systems. In effect, the contracts allowed Microsoft to monopolize the OEM market, but would 
raise OEM prices by only a small fraction, as the license fee was typically less than 3-4% of the price of a PC. The 
“free access” aspect would be problematic, since the marginal cost of making an additional copy of an operating 
system is essentially zero. Had this case gone to trial, an interesting issue would have been why MS-DOS competi-
tors could not contract with OEMs or vertically integrate into computing (a la Apple) to market their own operating 
systems. 
90  Microsoft II, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20533, at * 8.     16
This provision implies that Microsoft is not permitted to tie any other product to the operating 
system, but that it is permitted to integrate products into the operating system. Whether this pro-
vision constrained Microsoft’s conduct with respect to other products, particularly browsers, re-
mained to be seen. 
B.  Events leading to the 1998 litigation 
Shortly after Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson entered this decree, Microsoft introduced Win-
dows 95, followed by the first significant version of its Internet browser, Internet Explorer.
91 In 
late 1997, the Justice Department claimed that Microsoft had violated the above decree by forc-
ing OEMs to include IE with Windows 95.
92 The district court judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson, 
issued a preliminary injunction in December of that year to halt such inclusions.
93 The next 
month, January 1998, Microsoft and the Justice Department agreed to settle this issue in part.
94 
Although Microsoft would not delete the IE source code (i.e., the computer program) from its 
copies of Windows 95, it agreed to delete that part of the source code that would display the IE 
icon on the Windows 95 screen, or desktop, so consumers would not automatically presume that 
IE was on the computer.
95  
In 1998, Microsoft announced plans to introduce its next major operating system, Windows 
98, which was closely integrated with the latest version of Internet Explorer and which displayed 
the icon on the desktop.
96 On May 12 of that year, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
ruled that the consent decree provisions in the earlier case would not apply to Windows 98.
97 
Within a week, the Justice Department and twenty states initiated a new antitrust case against 
Microsoft.
98 The following month, on a 2-1 vote, the D.C. Circuit voided Judge Jackson’s 1997 
                                                                 
91 Petition By the United States for an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should Not 
be found in Civil Contempt, at ¶ V, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997) (Microsoft 
III) (No. 94-1564), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1200/1236.htm. A browser is a program that en-
ables a computer user to exploit the graphic links in pages written in the “hypertext markup language,” or HTML, to 
search for and display information stored on computers connected through the Internet using the “hyptertext transfer 
protocol,” or HTTP. The set of computers so linked is known as the World Wide Web (WWW). WebGuest Web 
Glossary, available at http://www.webguest.com/glossary/ (accessed Aug. 15, 2001).  
92 Petition by the United States ¶ V, Microsoft III (No. 94-1564). 
93 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997) (Microsoft III). 
94  See Stipulation and Order,  Microsoft _  (No. 94-1564),  available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/doj/finalstipulation.asp (accessed Aug. 15, 2001). 
95 Id. at ¶ I  
96 Mary Jo Foley,  Win98: It’s the Last of a Line,  ZDNN T ECH  NEWS  NOW  (June 24, 1998),  at 
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/zdnn_display/0,3440,2115046,00.html (accessed Aug. 15, 2001). 
97  Chronology of Events,  MICROSOFT  PRESS  PASS,  available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/timeline2.asp (accessed Aug. 15, 2001). 
98 Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Microsoft V) (No. 98-12) (find-
ings of fact). South Carolina dropped out before the case went to trial. The complaint is described infra at text ac-
companying notes 99-123.     17
injunction, holding that technical integration should be unrestricted unless it is a clear sham, 
largely because “[c]ourts are ill equipped to evaluate the benefits of high-tech product design.”
99  
In the shadow of this skepticism, the plaintiffs went ahead with their case. The trial began on 
October 1998. To expedite the trial, Judge Jackson set a limit of twelve witnesses for each 
side.
100 Each witness supplied direct testimony in advance, with courtroom proceedings limited 
to cross examination, along with assorted oral arguments and the use of videotaped depositions. 
Even with these limitations, the trial still went on until August 1999.  
C.  The complaint and case 
The essence of the plaintiffs’ case was that Microsoft viewed the ability to run applications 
delivered over the Internet as a threat to their franchise in an industry where applications were 
run from the desktop.
101 To do word processing in the Windows world, a user would run a copy 
of Microsoft Word or WordPerfect from the hard drive on his PC. In the potential Internet based 
programming environment, the user would access a remote word-processing program from the 
Internet to construct the document, running bits and pieces of it as needed for specific tasks.
102 
To run such programs, all the user would need would be a means to access the Internet—a 
browser—and a programming language designed to support these applications.
103  
If the browser and programming language were written to run on any PC operating system, 
users would no longer need to buy Windows, provided they had a Netscape browser and the Java 
programming language from Sun Microsystems to permit running applications via the 
browser.
104 Thus, the case primarily focused on Microsoft’s efforts to target Netscape, in terms 
of both effect and intent. The latter was perhaps encapsulated by a quote from a Microsoft execu-
tive expressing a desire to “cut off their air supply,” referring to Netscape.
105  
The plaintiffs’ factual allegations began with a claim that Microsoft has a monopoly in the 
market for Intel-based PC operating systems.
106 This monopoly allegedly followed from three 
facts about operating systems and computer usage. First, operating system production is subject 
to significant scale economies.
107 The fixed cost of developing a reasonably reliable
108 operating 
                                                                 
99 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 952 (1998) (Microsoft V). The dissenting judge argued that the 
courts could and should attempt to balance consumer benefits against the anticompetitive effects of tying, even when 
it involves software. Id. at 958 (Wald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
100 Pretrial Order No. 2, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (No. 98-1232) (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 1998), available at 
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/98-1232c.pdf (accessed Aug. 15, 2001).  
101 Complaint, ¶4-7, Microsoft VI (No. 98-1232).  
102 Id. ¶ 7, 9. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. ¶ 16. 
106 Id. ¶ 54. 
107 Direct Testimony of Franklin M. Fisher at 41, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(Microsoft VI) (No. 98-1232) (findings of fact), available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2000/2057.pdf (ac-
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system, which must both support pre-existing programs and facilitate innovative features in new 
ones, is enormous.
109 Once produced, however, the marginal cost of producing an additional 
copy of the operating system is essentially zero.
110 Operating systems are, in this technical sense, 
natural monopolies. 
Second, on top of scale economies in the supply of operating systems are  demand-side 
economies of scale, also known as “network externalities” or “network effects.”
111 A good or 
service possesses network externalities when the willingness of a consumer to buy a product 
goes up the more other people buy it.
112 The classic example is a telephone—the more people a 
customer can reach, the more valuable it becomes. Numerous factors combine to create network 
externalities in operating systems.
 113 One who learns how to use Windows will be able to oper-
ate any computer running Windows, so the value of learning it increases as the likelihood that 
one will see other Windows computers elsewhere increases. File sharing becomes easier as well, 
especially when other operating systems support incompatible hardware.
114 The more wide-
spread a particular OS, the more inviting it will be for software developers to write applications 
for it, thus making the OS more valuable to any particular user. 
A final argument supporting the contention that operating system markets are hard to enter is 
“application lock-in.”
115 This phrase refers to the idea that a new operating system developer will 
find it very difficult, if not impossible, to be successful unless it can provide consumers with the 
ability to read files and run applications designed for the operating system it replaces.
116 An op-
erating system entrant, however, must not only have a good operating system, but also one that 
either runs existing applications or has close versions of existing applications written for it.
117  
After arguing that Microsoft has a monopoly, the plaintiffs turned to Microsoft’s actions to 
impede Netscape’s success.
118 The plaintiffs began by alleging that Microsoft attempted in 1995 
to persuade Netscape to agree to an illegal division of the PC market, where Microsoft would sell 
IE exclusively to Windows users, while Netscape would retain the remainder of the PC business 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
108 Contrary to the wishes of some, the crashing of one’s Windows-based PC is not grounds for an antitrust viola-
tion. O ne could argue that if Microsoft’s actions prevented the entry of a more reliable operating system, such 
crashes could indicate some of the harm to consumers following such exclusionary conduct. I do not believe such an 
argument was made in this litigation. 
109 See Fisher Testimony, at ¶ 41, Microsoft VI (No. 98-1232). 
110 See id.; Microsoft VI, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
111 Fisher Testimony, ¶¶ 42-44, Microsoft VI (No. 98-1232). 
112 Microsoft VI, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20; STEPHEN J. BROWN & DAVID S. SIBLEY, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
PRICING 197-199 (1986). 
113 Microsoft VI, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20. I make this point painfully, as a longtime Macintosh user who finally 
threw in the towel in 1997 and bought a PC running Windows 95. 
114 For years, Apple and Intel-based PCs could not read floppy disks written on each other’s machines. 
115 United States v. Microsoft Corp, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (Microsoft VI) (findings of fact). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. Applications lock-in is mitigated when software companies can write essentially similar versions for dif-
ferent operating systems, and when the operating systems support the same file and hardware structures. 
118 Complaint ¶¶ 14-37, Microsoft VI (No. 98-1232).     19
for itself.
119 The core of the complaint, however, was a list of practices Microsoft undertook to 
allegedly make it more difficult to distribute Netscape.
120  
The plaintiffs revived the claim they used to obtain the injunction (that the Court of Appeals 
later rejected) that Microsoft had forced OEMs to take IE if they wanted to install Windows 95 
on their PCs.
121 Microsoft allegedly used its clout in the operating system market to force OEMs 
to maintain a uniform initial “boot up” screen that would display the availability of IE, at the ex-
clusion of Netscape.
122 Microsoft also designed Windows 98 in such a way as to effectively tie 
IE to Windows, with no countervailing consumer benefits.
123 The plaintiffs contended that Mi-
crosoft refused to give Internet service providers (ISPs) and Internet content providers (ICPs) 
display space on the initial Windows desktop unless they agreed to promote IE at Netscape’s ex-
pense.
124 The upshot was that Netscape’s ability to distribute its browser through OEMs or ISPs 
was severely restricted, and that consumers already receiving IE along with Windows would 
have little demand for Netscape’s product.
125 As the case progressed, the plaintiffs emphasized 
two additional claims. The first was that Microsoft attempted to “pollute” Java as a platform-
independent support program by developing a Windows-specific version.
126 The plaintiffs also 
offered testimony that the price Microsoft charged for IE—essentially, zero—was a predatory 
price.
127  
By and large, our purpose here is not to argue for or against the plaintiffs’ allegations. Some 
thoughts on Microsoft’s response, however, are in order. Essentially, the plaintiff’s case could be 
boiled down to four claims: (a) Microsoft has a monopoly in Intel-based PC operating systems; 
(b) Microsoft used that monopoly to exclude Netscape; (c) The exclusion was successful; (d) The 
success harmed consumers. Microsoft’s defense emphasized (a) and (b) in an attempt to persuade 
the court that it did not have a monopoly, and that it did not act to exclude Netscape.
128  
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cense by developing an incompatible version. The case was recently settled with the parties agreement stipulating 
that Microsoft’s license be voided, that Microsoft agrees not to use the “Java Compatible” trademark, and that Mi-
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available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/p-col/col.doc     20
Contesting (a), the existence of a monopoly in operating systems was a questionable tactic. 
Microsoft did not lack support, in that the Windows license fee had been low relative to the price 
of personal computers, and has remained low despite a huge fall in the price (adjusted for qual-
ity) of PCs.
129 One would normally expect that if a monopoly supplier of a product needed to use 
a second product, and the price of that second product plummets, the monopolist would find it 
profitable to raise its price by a little. Perhaps Microsoft was concerned that if it raised the oper-
ating system price high, it would face a larger threat of piracy, i.e., distribution of unauthorized 
copies. Nevertheless, Microsoft’s claim that it lacked market power because consumers could 
turn to other operating systems is, at best, a very hard sell. 
On the second argument, Microsoft may have been on slightly more secure ground, because 
the plaintiffs failed to allege that Microsoft refused to provide Netscape with the applications 
program interfaces (APIs) necessary for its product to run.
130 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were on 
secure ground in asserting that the contracts were exclusionary in nature.  
Microsoft would have been on stronger ground had it emphasized the last two aspects of the 
plaintiff’s argument. Microsoft did note that Netscape was available to consumers in other ways, 
such as mail order and downloading.
131 It also argued that IE’s success in the market was corre-
lated with positive product reviews in the trade press, rather than the result of its actions against 
Netscape.
132 Most importantly, Microsoft could have argued that, even if it were a monopolist 
and had succeeded in excluding Netscape, it made consumers better off. The company’s actions 
increased the operating systems’ capability at no cost, promoted useful standards for sharing ma-
terial over the World Wide Web, and created no additional market power for itself.
133 These 
points, however, may have been made less compelling by being combined with Microsoft’s as-
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130 See supra note 80.  
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133 Why Microsoft’s defense was so ineffective is open to speculation. One cannot rule out that it simply had a 
legally weak case. Its willingness to sacrifice credibility by fighting the proposition that it had a monopoly in operat-
ing systems, however, is difficult to explain unless it sincerely believed that it really was under siege. Another pos-
sibility is that its run of success at the Court of Appeals convinced it that it would ultimately prevail. At this writing, 
Microsoft may yet be proven right. Still, for a company with a market capitalization of up to half a trillion dollars, 
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sertions that it did not have a monopoly on operating systems or that it was not interested in 
overtaking Netscape through contracts with OEMs, ISPs, and ICPs.  
D.  The trial court decision and remedy order 
About three months after the trial ended, Judge Jackson issued the first of three important rul-
ings. This first ruling, on November 5, 1999 was his “findings of fact,” essentially agreeing with 
all of the contentions the plaintiffs made in the case.
134 Two weeks later, Judge Jackson ap-
pointed Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a leading expert in anti-
trust law and economics, to mediate settlement discussions between the plaintiffs and Micro-
soft.
135  
The settlement talks lasted until the early spring of 2000, but to no avail.
136 On April 3, 2000, 
Judge Jackson issued his “Conclusions of Law.”
137 Judge Jackson held that Microsoft’s actions 
to impede the success of Netscape and Java constituted monopolization of Intel-based PC operat-
ing systems and attempted monopolization of browsers in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
138 
He first found that Microsoft had a monopoly in Intel-based PC operating systems.
139 Microsoft 
initially acted to preserve that monopoly by attempting to persuade Netscape not to make its 
browser available for Windows PCs.
140 After Netscape refused, Microsoft targeted Netscape 
through licensing arrangements with OEMs and rewarding ISPs and ICPs for distributing IE in-
stead of Netscape.
141 Judge Jackson next found that Microsoft’s conduct with respect to IE was 
“predacious,” particularly in that it lost money by giving it away.
142 Judge Jackson also held as 
unlawful Microsoft’s efforts to develop and promote a Windows-specific Java to make it harder 
for other firms to supply operating systems that would compete with Windows.
143  
Explicitly rejecting the earlier rulings of the D.C. Circuit, Judge Jackson also held that Mi-
crosoft violated § 1 of the Sherman Act per se by tying IE to the Windows operating system, 
finding that Microsoft had a monopoly in the tying market, that the tied and tying products were 
in separate markets, and that consumers were injured by the practice.
144 To hold that Microsoft’s 
conduct satisfied these criteria, Judge Jackson restated his findings that Microsoft had a monop-
oly, that browsers and operating systems were separate products, and that forced bundling of IE 
with Windows hurt consumers.
145 However, he found that Microsoft was not guilty of violating § 
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1 through its exclusionary arrangements with OEMs, ISPs, ICPs, and other related companies.
146 
Jackson’s main empirical rationale for exonerating Microsoft on this count was that Netscape 
distributed 160 million copies and more than doubled its installed base from 15 million to 33 
million users during the time period at issue in the case.
147 
Two months later, on June 7, 2000, Judge Jackson accepted the recommendation of the Jus-
tice Department and seventeen states to break up Microsoft into two vertically separated applica-
tions companies.
148 One company, the “Operating System Business,” would get the Windows 
operating systems, defined as the “software that controls the allocation and usage of hardware 
resources” along with “additional shipped software.”
149 The second “Applications Business” 
would get the Office suite of applications and its components (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Out-
look), and “middleware” including the Internet Explorer browser and video and audio support.
150 
These two companies would not be permitted to merge or enter into a distribution agreement for 
ten years.
151 The Operating System Business would be required to grant all applications compa-
nies equal access to its APIs, so that the (former Microsoft) Applications Company’s products 
would not run faster or with more features than those of its competitors.
152 Until this reorganiza-
tion takes place, Microsoft would be enjoined from exclusive dealing, price discrimination, im-
posing restrictions on desktop displays, and other tying arrangements involving its operating sys-
tems.
153 
Two weeks later, Judge Jackson accepted the plaintiff’s request, under a rarely invoked pro-
vision of antitrust law,
154 to bypass the (presumably Microsoft-friendly) D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals and to submit the case directly to the Supreme Court for appeal.
155 The judge stayed the 
interim restrictions on Microsoft’s conduct until the Supreme Court could consider the appeal.
156 
On September 26, 2000, the Supreme Court denied the direct appeal, remanding the case to the 
D.C. Circuit for review.
157 
E.  The Court of Appeals decision 
On June 28, 2001, a seven-judge panel of the D.C. Court of Appeals issued a per curiam de-
cision affirming Judge Jackson in part, reversing in part, and vacating the remedy order, remand-
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ing to a different trial judge for further proceedings on liability and remedy.
158 Before getting to 
the substance of the case, the court began by observing that rapid technological change in com-
puting makes formulating both structural and conduct remedies difficult, and that there is no 
consensus among commentators demanding amendment of monopolization doctrine in this in-
dustry.
159 
Regarding Judge Jackson’s findings regarding monopolization, the court first upheld the dis-
trict court’s finding that Microsoft held monopoly power.
160 It agreed with the trial court that the 
relevant market was Intel-based personal computer operating systems, specifically excluding 
Apple Computer’s operating system, information appliances, and the “middleware” combination 
of Netscape and Java.
161 The court held that Microsoft had monopoly power in that market, as 
indicated by both market share and the entry barrier created by the difficulty in writing operating 
systems that would run applications.
162 In doing so, the court rejected Microsoft’s claims that it 
priced Windows too low to be a monopolist.
163 Moreover, with some minor modifications, the 
court of appeals upheld Judge Jackson’s findings that the anticompetitive effects of Microsoft’s 
practices - licensing to OEMs,
164 integration of IE and Windows,
165 exclusionary contracts with 
ISPs and independent software developers,
166 and attempts to discourage cross-platform Java
167- 
all outweighed any procompetitive justifications, and hence violated §#2 of the Sherman Act.
168 
The court rejected Microsoft’s claims that Judge Jackson erroneously found this conduct exclu-
sionary under §#2 but not under §#1,
169 and that a holding of antitrust liability requires that Mi-
crosoft’s actions actually caused the monopoly power it currently holds.
170 
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From this point, the court of appeals decision turns more in Microsoft’s favor. It rejected 
Judge Jackson’s finding that Microsoft attempted to monopolize the browser market, because the 
record provided insufficient evidence that browsers were a market or that any such market is dif-
ficult to enter. 
171 The court then remanded the § 1 tying claim for further adjudication, rejecting 
Judge Jackson’s finding that Microsoft’s bundling of IE with Windows was per se illegal.
172 The 
requirement that the tied and tying products be separate “may not give newly integrated products 
a fair shake,”
173 and that tying may produce efficiencies in the face of the “pervasively innova-
tive character of platform software markets.”
174 If plaintiffs were to pursue the case on remand, 
the court issued three instructions:  
(1) The plaintiffs would have to show that tying unreasonably restrained competition, but 
could not base such allegations on a “browser market” or barriers to entry into such a 
market, having foregone the opportunity to show such facts in the initial litigation.
175 
(2) Plaintiffs must also show that any anticompetitive effects of Microsoft’s refusing to let 
OEMs or consumers remove IE from PCs using Windows 95 or 98 outweigh the benefits; 
the actions alone will not support a finding of §#2 liability.
176 
(3) The trial court would also need to consider whether Microsoft engaged in “price bun-
dling,” i.e., charging more for Windows and IE than what the price would have been for 
Windows alone, and in refusing to make Windows available at that low price.
177  
The court of appeals then vacated the vertical divestiture order for three reasons. First, the 
trial judge failed to hold evidentiary hearings when relevant facts were in dispute.
178 The court 
also found that because Judge Jackson ignored relevant Supreme Court precedent, his stated jus-
tifications for the remedy were inadequate.
179 Finally, the court, having vacated the district 
court’s remedy decree and remanded the tying claim for further adjudication, held that a remedy 
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needs to be supported in remand in light of the changes in findings of liability.
180 On remand, the 
trial court will have to consider carefully whether the benefits of any divestiture exceed the costs, 
and whether Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct in fact led to its dominance in operating sys-
tems.
181 The remainder of the decision was devoted to a discussion of Judge Jackson’s miscon-
duct by giving press interviews about the case during the trial, in which he reflected a lack of 
impartiality.
182 The court of appeals ultimately disqualified him retroactively from the remedy 
phase of the case.
183  
IV.  Posing the question 
From an economic perspective, the ideal antitrust case would follow a simple structure. It 
would begin with a theory of anticompetitive conduct and effect. The theory would be grounded 
in economic methods based on maximization of consumer utility and firm profits, expressed 
within a specified institutional and informational structure.  
This theory would then imply a set of confirming evidence. Depending on the robustness of 
the theory, some of this evidence would establish whether the contextual assumptions of the the-
ory are in fact valid, regarding matters such as barriers to entry, market concentration, demand 
elasticities, strategic choices, credibility of commitments, and information asymmetries. With 
Chicago school theories, only entry barriers, market concentration, and demand might matter; 
with post-Chicago theories, the other strategic elements may play a more significant role.
184 The 
theory would specify what evidence would be necessary to confirm or refute its applicability in 
the particular case, e.g., whether the predicted conduct ensued and whether it tended to reduce 
output and raise prices without commensurate improvements in product quality or (perhaps) re-
duced production costs. 
Following this conception, an internally sound theory of antitrust liability together with con-
firming evidence would imply a remedy. A remedy serves a role different from punishment or 
deterrence. Its function is to change the situation so that the conditions supporting the theory of 
anticompetitive conduct no longer hold, and in so doing prevent future occurrences of the ad-
verse consequences identified by the theory and confirmed by the evidence. In my view, reme-
dies fall into two broad categories. The first category, structural, includes remedies that change 
the firm itself, e.g., ordering a divestiture. The second category, injunctive or behavioral, in-
cludes remedies that leave the firm as it is but remove its ability to undertake specified types of 
conduct. The former is often preferable in theory, in that structural remedies often remove both 
the incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive practices while behavioral remedies typi-
cally address only ability. On the other hand, structural remedies both unravel an established 
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corporate structure, making them difficult to implement, and impede the realization of economies 
of scale and scope. Structural remedies may create a cure worse than the disease. 
We can illustrate the preceding analysis with a diagram: 
  
Ideal case  Theory =>  Evidence =>  Remedy 
The following diagram illustrates the plaintiffs’ case, using the theory and evidence emphasized 
in the complaint and the remedy they recommended and that Judge Jackson accepted.
185 
       
Case  Theory  Evidence  Remedy 
Plaintiff’s case:  MS developed IE 
and Windows-
specific Java to 
impede OS, appli-
cation p latform 
entry 
MS used OEM, 






MS into OS and 
apps companies 
The core argument is that the three primary components of the plaintiffs’ case do not match the 
ideal economists’ case as specified above. The conceptual chain from theory to evidence to rem-
edy is not followed; arguably, no two of these three components are so connected. The central 
evidence adduced by the plaintiffs does not follow from the theory of the case, and the remedy is 
logically connected to neither.  
The following diagram leaves blanks for us to develop the evidence and remedy that would 
match the theory in the case, the theory and remedy that best match the evidence, and the theory 
and evidence that would support the remedy: 
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Case  Theory  Evidence  Remedy 
Protecting the 
OS monopoly: 
MS developed IE 
and Windows-








?  MS used OEM, 






?  ?  Vertically divide 
MS into OS and 
apps companies 
As we fill in these blanks, each of the three rows will illustrate an economically consistent case 
that might have been filed against Microsoft. The leftmost entry in each row is the shorthand 
name of such a case. But as each entry in the column is different, no one of these cases will 
match the one that the plaintiffs presented. That the plaintiffs in United States v. Microsoft were 
so successful despite this lack of economic consistency indicates the decline in the value of eco-
nomics in defining and litigating a major antitrust case. 
The following table summarizes where we are headed by filling in the blanks: 
 
Case  Theory  Evidence  Penalty 
Protecting the 
OS monopoly: 
MS developed IE 
and Windows-









Bite the bullet: 
Limit MS innova-





vant market in 
means for distrib-
uting browsers  
MS used OEM, 











by not d eveloping 
Word, O ffice for 
Word, Office killer 
apps; MS favored 
its own applica-
Vertically divide 
MS into OS and 
applications com-    28






Entries in lighter text are the components of the plaintiffs’ case. The other entries in each row of 
the table indicate how one might develop economically consistent cases out of each of those 
components. 
V.  Theory and evidence 
A.  Filling in the blanks—Part 1: Building on the core evidence  
The easiest story to tell involves the middle row of the table above, beginning with the evi-
dence involving Microsoft’s efforts to impede the distribution of Netscape. The theory to which 
this evidence speaks most directly is that Microsoft monopolized the means by which Netscape 
could distribute its browser to consumers. By definition, whether Microsoft was successful in 
that monopolization largely depends on whether its exclusionary contracts tied up a “monopoly” 
share of all that lies in the relevant market for browser distribution.  
The associated theory posits that packaging browsers with personal computers or distributing 
them via a customer’s Internet service and content provider constitutes a dominant share of the 
distribution market. If it does not, Microsoft would not be able to make it significantly more ex-
pensive for Netscape to deliver its browser. Whether this had been accomplished is arguable. The 
evidentiary heart of the plaintiffs’ case was that Netscape was injured through the various means 
Microsoft took to keep OEMs, ISPs, and ICPs from distributing Netscape’s browser.
187 On the 
other hand, downloading and mail are potential substitutes for OEM or ISP distribution, particu-
larly since Netscape’s browser was available without charge.
188 Also, as noted above, Judge 
Jackson found in his conclusions of law that Netscape had managed to distribute its browser and 
double its use during the period in question.
189  
Assuming that Microsoft had monopolized browser distribution, the appropriate remedy 
would be for it to divest its share of the distribution market so that it no longer retained power 
over that market. A draconian remedy would be to force Microsoft to eliminate all of its exclu-
sionary dealings. Such a remedy, however, would be akin to requiring a firm that had created a 
monopoly by purchasing its competitors’ factories to divest not only the plants it bought but also 
the plants it originally owned. A more reasonable remedy would be to allow Microsoft to sign 
such contracts with some of the OEMs or ISPs, but not with so many as to allow it to dominate 
the browser distribution market.  
                                                                 
187 See infra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
188 On whether this is a reasonable way to construct a predation case, see infra text accompanying notes 212-214, 
266-74; see also GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 44 at 137-44. 
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A row indicating the theory and remedy that best fits the evidence in the case is provided be-
low: 
 





vant market in 
means for distrib-
uting browsers  
MS used OEM, 




that give exclusive 
access to monopoly 
share  of distribu-
tion market 
Two caveats are necessary. First, some may argue that the evidence speaks to the stated the-
ory of the case, in which Microsoft was impeding Netscape and Java to protect its operating sys-
tem monopoly. As we see below, that theory best emphasizes a different set of facts than those 
focusing primarily on browser distribution.
190 To be sure, an interest in protecting its operating 
system monopoly may explain why Microsoft might have been interested in monopolizing 
browser distribution.
191 But whatever its motive, Microsoft could not impede Netscape’s distri-
bution without acquiring power over its operations in that market.
192 Such power is not only a 
necessary condition for an antitrust violation; it is presumably sufficient to establish anticompeti-
tive monopolization of a relevant market.
193  
Second, some of the evidence introduced in the case was not only about Netscape distribu-
tion. Much of the case was devoted to establishing Microsoft’s intent to eliminate Netscape as a 
competitor.
194 The parties addressed intent, in part, through internal corporate documents
195 and 
through the presentation of a pattern of conduct along with an emphasis on specific episodes.
196 
We turn to the role of such arguments in an economically oriented antitrust case below.
197 As 
noted above, the plaintiffs introduced additional claims involving Microsoft’s development of a 
Windows-specific Java and predatory pricing of Internet Explorer.
198 The predatory claims were 
not a separate finding, but are better characterized as part of the holistic case to be considered 
below.
199 We will also examine how a post-Chicago predation case against Microsoft could and 
                                                                 
190 See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. 
191 The plaintiffs suggest this in their complaint. See Complaint, ¶¶10, 15, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Microsoft _) (No. 98-1232) (findings of fact). 
192 See infra text accompanying notes 182. 
193 For more on how actions targeted at competitors could and should be thought of in terms of monopolization 
of an input market, see Timothy J. Brennan,  Understanding “Raising Rivals’ Costs,” 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 95 
(1988). 
194 Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 17, Microsoft _ (No. 98-1232). 
195 Id. ¶ 17. 
196 Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law, at 50-53, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2000) ( Microsoft _ ) (No. 98-1232) (conclusion of law),  available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3900/3932ftm. 
197 See infra text accompanying notes 303-10. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. 
199 See infra text accompanying notes 212.     30
perhaps should have been constructed.
200 Java manipulation is properly relevant evidence for the 
presented theory of the case but, as we see in the following section, it is only a small part of a 
much larger set of evidence that was largely neglected, if not contradicted.  
B.  Filling in the blanks—Part 2: Establishing the plaintiff’s theory 
The central theory of the case against Microsoft is that it was protecting its monopoly by tar-
geting Netscape. An economically consistent statement of such a case would require some sub-
stantial theoretical refinement and the establishment of a delicate collection of evidence largely 
different from that at the hub of United States v. Microsoft. Establishing such a theory, however, 
presented many obstacles.  
The first obstacle was one the plaintiffs could not necessarily avoid. A necessary predicate of 
a monopolization case seems to be that the alleged monopolizer already has a monopoly to pro-
tect.
201 From an economic perspective, this requires the plaintiff in a monopolization case to 
show that the defendant has a monopoly that is not threatened by entry from competitors. In 
United States V. Microsoft, the plaintiffs fulfilled this task by claiming that the relevant market 
was Intel-based PC operating systems, with entry barred by scale economies, network external-
ities, and application lock-in.
202 This task, however, is inherently problematic, because the more 
a plaintiff is successful at showing that the defendant has a safe monopoly that it can use as a 
platform for nefarious deeds, the harder it should be to show that those deeds are necessary to 
protect this market from entry. Ideally, one would want to show that “but for” the deeds, this 
monopoly would fall apart.  
One way out of this dilemma begins by distinguishing the present market in which the defen-
dant currently has a monopoly from the future market that it is allegedly attempting to monopo-
lize. For Microsoft, Netscape with Java posed the threat that computer users would be able to run 
applications off the Internet, rendering it less important to have sophisticated desktop operating 
systems, such as Windows, to which applications must be specifically written and for which spe-
cific expertise is necessary. In that sense, Netscape plus Java would be a substitute for Windows. 
But while Netscape plus Java may be a means by which consumers might be able to use applica-
tions residing on distant servers via the Internet,
203 their combination is not an Intel-based PC 
operating system.”
204 Accordingly, the market definition should not be limited to “Intel-based PC 
operating systems; it should rather be redefined more broadly as application platforms. The mar-
ket would include both Microsoft desktop operating systems and browser-based Internet server 
interfaces. It would include software that allows devices to run applications with important capa-
                                                                 
200 See infra text accompanying notes 266-74. 
 
201 Microsoft _, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (“The threshold element of a § 2 monopolization offense being ‘the posses-
sion of monopoly power in the relevant market,’”) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
(1966)).  
202 See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text. 
203 Complaint ¶¶ 6-8, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Microsoft VI) (No. 98-
1232) (findings of fact), available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm. 
204 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 27-29 (D.D.C. 1999) (Microsoft _) (findings of fact).     31
bilities (word processing, spreadsheets, electronic mail, browsing) from a device on a customer’s 
premises, whether that device is a sophisticated Pentium personal computer or relatively simple 
Internet access equipment.  
This target application platform market is largely not a present market but a potential market 
in the future, if at all.
205 Developing evidence to validate the theory of the case for such a market 
requires a dynamic approach explaining how one’s dominant position in both desktops and 
browsers today would allow one to dominate application platforms tomorrow. This approach un-
covers two aspects of a potential case that were largely omitted in the actual case. The first as-
pect is demonstrating what advantage a monopoly today provides for obtaining a monopoly to-
morrow. In conventional industries, the answer is obvious—ownership of durable physical facili-
ties committed to serve the market in question, be they factories, airplanes, or telephone lines. 
Thus, this aspect was not necessary in traditional antitrust cases. In computing, while the soft-
ware itself is durable, rapid changes in technology, infrastructure, and consumer acceptance of 
various services means that a plaintiff opposing Microsoft should have some burden of showing 
that a monopoly today positions Microsoft to compete for the monopoly tomorrow.  
The second neglected aspect is showing that two products that are complements today—
browsers and desktop operating systems such as Windows—are substitute inputs in the produc-
tion of applications platforms in the future.
206 Presumably, the plaintiffs did not devote much at-
tention to this because the market they defined, “Intel-based PC operating systems,” was not a 
market in which the target firm, Netscape, participated. Showing this substitution is crucial. The 
core of the monopolization complaint against Microsoft is that having a desktop monopoly today 
is not enough to provide a compelling competitive advantage in future applications platforms; it 
needs to also have a strong presence, if not monopoly, over browsers. The claim is that separate 
monopolies today lead to a single monopoly tomorrow.
207 The dimensions along which desktop 
operating systems and browsers compete as in the market for “inputs into providing a competi-
tive advantage in future application platforms” are not immediately obvious. They may involve 
economies of scope between either of them and future application platforms, technological ex-
pertise, or establishing a client base that can be used to introduce future products. 
These theoretical clarifications suggest a range of relevant evidence, which was largely un-
touched, that would show:  
                                                                 
205 Id. 
206 Models that may speak to this issue are the “dynamic models” of exclusion involving firms in multiple related 
markets, as set out in Dennis Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why As-
pen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 668-71 (2001)  
207 Were it not for the “single monopoly tomorrow,” integration within a single company of monopolies of com-
plements could reduce prices and increase output. With separately owned monopolies, each will raise price without 
taking into account how one’s high price reduces the profits of the other. This is known as the “double marginaliza-
tion” problem. Vertical integration “internalizes” these externalities, reducing the incentive of either monopoly to 
raise prices. See TIROLE, supra note 73, at 174-75.     32
•  “Future applications platforms” and “inputs to future applications platforms” are the rele-
vant markets, rather than “Intel-based PC operating systems,” “browsers,” or as in the 
above case, “browser distribution.”  
•  Windows and browsers are presently substitute inputs in establishing oneself as a signifi-
cant competitor in that market. 
•  “Netscape + Java” is the best substitute for Windows and Internet Explorer in this “input 
to future application platforms.” 
•  Entry into that market is difficult, i.e., it is costly to successfully introduce browsers and 
supporting application language.  
•  No other technologies (e.g., personal digital assistant software, third-generation wireless 
devices) are also potential inputs into the development of future application platforms.  
A useful test of this theory would be whether Windows prices would rise or fall if Microsoft had 
been prohibited from developing a browser. If the two were complements in a static market, the 
price of Windows would rise, as Microsoft would lose an opportunity to capture profits through 
browser distribution. If, as this monopolization theory requires, Windows and Internet Explorer 
were substitutes, than the price of Windows would fall, as Microsoft would want to expand 
whatever strategic position in the future applications platform market that sales of current desk-
top operating systems affords. 
By and large, the plaintiffs did not take this tack. Netscape with Java was not in the market 
that the plaintiffs defined as relevant in this case. Having defined neither an applications market 
nor inputs into it, the plaintiffs could not and did not offer economic or technical evidences that 
Netscape plus Java was the sole competitor to Windows in this market. Similarly, they did not 
establish that barriers to entry into these markets were sufficiently high for monopolization of 
that market to be successful.  
This is not to say that the plaintiffs could not have made such a case involving strategic posi-
tioning for dominance of future markets. I suspect that they could, but to have done so would 
have required unorthodox market definitions that would likely have been difficult to support with 
conventional evidentiary techniques. As a consequence, the theory would have been hard to sell 
to the court. As noted above, the theory, supported by evidence that Microsoft executives viewed 
Netscape as a competitive threat, did underscore why Microsoft was interested in impeding Net-
scape distribution.
208 While not in the original complaint from the Justice Department, Micro-
soft’s efforts to develop a nonstandard version of Java, and thus impede Java’s development as a 
platform-independent applications support language, offered some support as well.
209 But the 
                                                                 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 198-202. 
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Java license in its development of a version that would run only on Windows. The case, filed before the Justice De-
partment’s complaint in United States v. Microsoft, was resolved via a settlement after the trial and lower court deci-
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theory, apart from its role as a motive, was not directly given the support necessary to establish it 
in economic terms as the basis for antitrust liability.  
Were this path followed, the appropriate remedy, following the economic characterization of 
ideal antitrust cases above,
210 would be to limit Microsoft’s share of “inputs to future application 
platforms” to prevent its monopolization of that market. Assuming that there would be no effec-
tive way to truncate Microsoft’s share by reducing its share of the desktop operating system 
business, the direct remedy would be to divest its browser, on the grounds that developing a 
browser (and impeding Netscape) gave it too great a share in this “input” market. A remedy 
based on the theory would entail something the plaintiffs’ were likely and understandably reluc-
tant to do, namely, to limit Microsoft’s ability to innovate.
211 Microsoft claimed all along that 
this was what the plaintiffs had in mind.
212 Had the case been conducted more explicitly along 
the lines of protecting the potential for competition in future applications platforms by limiting 
Microsoft’s share of inputs into that market, Microsoft may have been right. Yet, the plaintiffs 
might also have been right to insist on that outcome, had they developed the required evidence.  
This path of evidence and remedy are summarized in the row below. 
 
  Theory  Evidence  Remedy 
Protecting the 
OS monopoly: 
MS developed IE 
and Windows-









Bite the bullet: 
Limit MS innova-
tion, divest IE 
That this evidence and remedy were substantially bypassed suggests that, in the trenches, hewing 
carefully to a strategic, post-Chicago analysis will be rejected for an impressionistic, intent-based 
pre-Chicago case.  
C.  Tensions and contradictions in the “Conclusions of Law”  
One way to test whether the theory and evidence really did fit together coherently would be 
to look at the trial court’s determinations, particularly Judge Jackson’s “Conclusions of Law,” 
which stated his holdings regarding Microsoft’s legal liability, based upon his “Findings of 
                                                                 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 179-81. 
211 As noted above, the proposed remedy in United States v. Microsoft included divestiture of the browser, but as 
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not just the browser, but every application not defined by the plaintiffs to be part of the operating system. We dis-
cuss this in the following part of the article. 
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Fact.”
213 Unfortunately, the “Conclusions of Law” included internal tensions, if not contradic-
tions, in its economic implications. In that sense, the Conclusions of Law exemplify the para-
phrased adage in the title of the paper—an easy case (clearly won at trial) makes for bad law (in 
giving little weight to economic consistency).  
The first tension involves market definition. Microsoft was found guilty of monopolization 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, in protecting its monopoly in operating systems by impeding the 
development of competing browsers.
214 To support this conclusion the trial judge needed to find 
that browsers (with Java) and operating systems would have been competing in the operating 
system market in which Microsoft had its monopoly. But his finding of Sherman Act § 1 liability 
for tying browsers to the operating system required that the market for browsers and operating 
systems were separate.
215 Without such separation, one cannot have two products to tie.
216 
Hence, we have browsers and operating systems in the same market in the first substantive part 
of the decision, and in separate markets in the second. 
A second tension involves the effects on consumers. Judge Jackson’s § 2 monopolization 
finding was based in part on a belief that IE was priced too cheaply relative to its cost, as part of 
Microsoft’s “predacious” conduct.
217 The heart of a predation claim is that a good is being of-
fered at a price below cost to make it inappropriately attractive to consumers, making it too hard 
for competitors to survive.
218 But to support the § 1 tying claim in the subsequent section of the 
Conclusions of Law, the judge apparently needed to find that consumers were harmed by having 
to get Internet Explorer.
219 If consumers were made worse off by having to get IE, as posited in 
the tying claim, substitute browsers would have been more attractive, not less. So, were consum-
ers hurt by having to get IE? Or were they made so much better off with IE, relative to its zero 
price, that Netscape was unable to compete?  
Last but not least, Judge Jackson found support in his finding that Netscape was “success-
fully ostracized” by Microsoft’s exclusionary tactics.
220 Yet, in refusing to find Microsoft liable 
for anticompetitive exclusionary contracting under § 1 of the Sherman Act, he found that Net-
scape distributed 160 million copies and doubled its user base during the period when it was tar-
                                                                 
213 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) ( Microsoft VII) (conclusions of law); 
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214 See supra text accompanying notes 136-39. 
215 Microsoft _, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 47-51. 
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do. Operating systems have come to include graphic user interfaces, equipment drivers, and assorted games and util-
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217 Microsoft _, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
218 GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 44, at 137. 
219 Microsoft _, 87 F.Supp. 2d at 50. 
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geted by Microsoft’s conduct.
221 In facing these tensions regarding market definition, harm to 
consumers, and effects on Netscape, the Conclusions of Law, and the case for which it was writ-
ten, would have been much stronger and unified had it ended after finding § 2 liability, without 
attempting to deal with tying or exclusionary contracting. 
The court of appeals decision did little to resolve these tensions. Although it backed off from 
the finding that browsers and operating systems are separate products,
222 the court supported 
Judge Jackson’s definition of the market as “Intel-based PC operating systems” and his exclusion 
of Netscape and Java from the market.
223 However, in supporting the conclusion that Microsoft 
violated § 2 of the Sherman Act, the court called Netscape and Java a “nascent threat” as a “vi-
able platform substitute,”
224 suggesting that a monopolization finding requires that both Win-
dows and Netscape with Java are in some sort of “applications platform market.” The court dis-
missed the tension concerning whether consumers were harmed or not by the pricing of IE by 
essentially dismissing claims that it had been priced below cost.
225 Finally, the court, following 
Judge Jackson, claimed that standards for proving exclusion under § 1 of the Sherman Act are 
stricter than that for § 2,
226 although it did not address Judge Jackson’s finding that Netscape 
doubled its installed base and distributed 160 million copies.  
VI.  The remedy 
A.  Filling in the blanks—Part 3: Supporting the remedy  
However shaky the economic connection between the theory and the evidence may be, the 
connections between either of them and the remedy proposed by the plaintiff strike me as even 
more tenuous. The plaintiffs’ justification for the remedy began with a claim that the root cause 
of the problem was Microsoft’s monopoly in operating systems and record of anticompetitive 
conduct.
227 However, direct remedies to eliminate that monopoly by a horizontal division, in 
which multiple “baby Bills” would have the right to sell and develop Windows, were determined 
                                                                 
221 Id. at 53. Judge Jackson found that to hold Microsoft in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act for exclusive 
dealing, it had to “actually shut [Netscape] out of the Web browser market.” Id. 
222 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(Microsoft _).  
223 Id. at 51-54. 
224 Id. at 79. 
225 Id. at 97. 
226 Id. at 47. The court stated that to show exclusion under § 1, the exclusive contracts have to foreclose competi-
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less did not reverse Judge Jackson’s ruling. Id. The court did not state the market in which this 40-50% share figure 
applies. Defining the market in terms of distribution would make more economic sense. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 182-88. The court, however, makes no mention of any such market. If the market in question refers to that 
in which the alleged monopolist holds a monopoly, however, it would seem that any market in which there were 
only two significant sellers would have one with more than 50% of the market, thus subjecting it to a finding that the 
distribution arrangements it employed violated the antitrust laws. 
227 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment, at 14-24, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) ( Microsoft_) (No. 98-1232) (final judgment),  available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4600/4640.htm.     36
to be potentially wasteful and inefficient.
228 The market would lose the network externalities that 
come from a standard operating system.
229 Injunctive or conduct remedies would impose exces-
sive burdens on the plaintiffs and the court to oversee Microsoft’s operations.
230 Moreover, the 
case itself provided some indication that the injunctive remedies in the earlier, mid-1990s case 
against Microsoft had not worked.
231  
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the vertical divestiture was chosen because it was the 
only remedy left, having eliminated horizontal divestitures and injunctive relief from considera-
tion. The plaintiffs’ affirmative case for the remedy rested on three planks.
232 First, and most im-
portantly for the plaintiffs, making the applications arm of Microsoft independent would improve 
its incentives to write programs for other operating system competitors, such as Linux and Inter-
net-based server systems of the sort Netscape plus Java could support.
233 While the plaintiffs’ 
offered “no guarantee” that such development would occur, this development would, in their 
view, address the “application lock-in” that discourages users from switching to different operat-
ing systems.
234 
A second rationale for the vertical divestiture was potential entry, primarily that a firm offer-
ing Microsoft Office and other “middleware” would be a good candidate to develop its own op-
erating system or support other applications.
235 The third plank supporting the remedy was the 
plaintiffs’ contention that the corporate reorganizations of this sort are common and, thus, would 
not reduce Microsoft’s market value.
236 
The most striking aspect of this remedy is the near disappearance of the browser. Whether 
the case was based on browser distribution directly or to strategically subvert competition in fu-
ture applications platforms, Netscape and Internet Explorer were the central characters.
237 In the 
remedy, browsers become little more than a part of the middleware category of software, just one 
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237 The theory of the case and evidence involved browsers. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03, 116-23. 
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component among with email streaming audio and video.
238 To further reduce the prominence of 
the browser, the central focus of the remedy was not even middleware, but the Office application 
program suite.
239 The remedy fits a theory premised on the view that Word and Office were the 
core monopolies that Microsoft used to limit competition from other operating systems. As the 
plaintiffs said in their brief proposing the remedy, the “court must use the record of [the] trial to 
fashion . . . relief,”
240 but that record was not based on a theory that put Office (or the broad 
category of middleware) at the hub of the competitive problem. As far back as the first Microsoft 
case, critics of Microsoft have long complained that it favored its applications over others, e.g., 
in receiving access to undisclosed APIs, but that was not a part of this case.
241  
The case here was not concerned with whether Microsoft Office was the best entrant into op-
erating systems, or whether it in fact had a monopoly in its own application markets. “Applica-
tion lock-in” does not depend on the applications in question being Microsoft applications. Com-
puter users are just as locked in to Windows if they are accustomed to using programs by other 
companies (e.g., the WordPerfect word processing program) designed to run on it. Finally, if 
firms in the computer industry are vulnerable to competition from vertically related firms, per-
haps Microsoft’s monopoly was not as secure as the plaintiffs’ portrayed. 
An economically consistent post-Chicago case with Microsoft Word and Microsoft Office as 
the monopoly lynchpin, leading to the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, may well have been possible. 
But that case would have had a different theory and set of evidence than in United States V. Mi-
crosoft. The following row e ncapsulates what such a case would entail.
242 
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240 Id. at 27. 
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98-1232). The first question this contention begs is where the monopoly profits are. If the remedy would reduce or 
eliminate Microsoft’s market power, on whatever theory, Microsoft’s profits and market value would presumably 
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if not explicitly stated in the plaintiffs memorandum, would be that Microsoft would be better off undertaking a ver-
tical divestiture, and that it is irrationally foregoing profits by doing so. Id. It is one thing for the government to rec-
ommend a divestiture on the grounds that it would alleviate harms to competition, and quite another to do so be-
cause it believes it knows better than the firms managers and stockholders what forms of organization would maxi-
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B.  The failed analogy to United States v. AT&T 
A more troubling contention is that the divestiture in the Microsoft is just like that in United 
States v. AT&T.
243 The divestiture in that case, as with Microsoft, was vertical. As a result of a 
settlement announced in early 1982, AT&T spun off in 1984 its local telephone companies, re-
taining its long distance telephone business and equipment manufacturing operations.
244 Except 
for providing Yellow Pages directory advertising and selling “customer premises equipment,” 
mainly telephones, the divested “Bell Operating Companies” were prevented from offering long 
distance telephone and information services, and from manufacturing equipment.
245 In 1990, fol-
lowing the instructions of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the trial court overseeing the dives-
titure lifted the information services ban, as neither the Justice Department nor AT&T expressed 
any interest in retaining it.
246 The remaining terms of the divestiture lasted until passage of the 
Telecommunications Act in 1996.
247 The Telecommunications Act vacated the consent decree in 
United States v. AT&T, substituting statutory procedures for allowing the Bell Operating Com-
panies to enter these other markets, particularly long distance telephone service. 
Any resemblance between these cases beyond the remedy is superficial. The AT&T case was 
based on the theory that vertical integration served as a means for it to evade regulation of the 
market power inherent in its local telephone monopolies, which were (and may still be) impervi-
ous to entry.
248 One dimension of this case involved claims that AT&T discriminated against its 
competitors in long distance by offering them low quality access or denying connections alto-
gether.
249 This discrimination resulted in the anticompetitive effect of essentially allowing AT&T 
to tie its long distance service to its local service.
250 Because the price for the latter was set below 
the monopoly price, it would be able to capture that monopoly margin by raising the price for the 
former. A second dimension is “cross-subsidization;” AT&T could disguise the costs of provid-
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246 United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991). 
247 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 271, 47 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).. 
248 For a review of the theory of United States v. AT&T, see Timothy Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should Be 
Kept Out of Unregulated Markets, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 741 (1987). 
249 Id. at 750-57, 775-76; see also United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp at 142, 161. 
250 Brennan, supra note 243, at 775-76.     39
ing competitive service as cost of providing regulated local telephone service, and use regulation 
to pass those costs on to its local telephone customers.
251 Such cost shifting would profit AT&T, 
and perhaps serve to make credible predatory threats to charge below-cost prices for competitive 
services, because local telephone rates were below the monopoly price.
252 
The divestiture in the AT&T case was based on isolating its competitive businesses from its 
regulated monopolies, to take away the incentive and ability to capture the profits of those mo-
nopolies through diversification into related markets. This rationale does not apply in  United 
States v. Microsoft. Unlike AT&T’s local telephone monopolies, Microsoft’s operating system is 
not price-regulated.
253 Nothing stops Microsoft from charging what the market will bear; it has 
no apparent need to diversify just to exploit its market power in desktop operating systems.
254  
Furthermore, the remedy in  United States v. AT&T was predicated on the idea that firms 
harm consumers when they straddle the boundary between regulated monopolies and competi-
tive services.
255 This remedy not only mandated a divestiture, but it also prevented the firms 
from reintegrating into each other’s markets.
256 Absent this, the divested local telephone compa-
nies could reconstitute the market structure that led to the antitrust concerns motivating the 
case.
257 In stark contrast, the remedy in United States v. Microsoft is predicated in part on the 
hope that the vertically separated entities might eventually compete with each other.
258 In other 
words, there is nothing inherently harmful about Microsoft’s vertically integrated structure. 
Rather, the rationale for the divestiture is that it offers hope for some competition in operating 
systems or applications. 
United States v. AT&T was a paradigm case in which the theory, evidence, and remedy fit to-
gether as a piece of economics. The theory of the case, based on the potential for abuse of mo-
nopolies created by the combination of regulation and vertical integration, dictated the litigation 
and remedy. Unlike in United States v Microsoft, the plaintiffs’ remedy and the theory behind it 
were clearly known from the start of the trial. If the Microsoft case matched the AT&T case in 
those respects, there would be far less concern with a changing role of economics in antitrust. 
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VII.  Other neglected or undeveloped theories  
A.  Three more stories that could have been told 
Criticizing the plaintiffs’ case by no means supports a conclusion that Microsoft’s conduct 
was benign. In suggesting that the plaintiffs’ theory, evidence, and remedy do not fit a single 
economically sound case, we identified three different such cases that might have been brought 
against Microsoft. We can also identify three additional economic cases that might have been 
brought against Microsoft, based on tying, predation, and an excessively large monopoly in op-
erating systems. 
As with the three different cases within United States v. Microsoft, we can display these addi-
tional potential cases in tabular form.  
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Had any of these cases been carried out, the plaintiffs would have had an opportunity to expand 
and clarify the role of post-Chicago economics, rather than implicitly call the role of economics 
in antitrust into question. 
B.  Missed opportunity 1: Refining tying  
Part of the plaintiffs’ case and the trial court’s decision involved claims that Microsoft had 
effectively tied its browser, Internet Explorer, to its monopoly in Windows operating systems.
259 
From the Chicago perspective, tying cases have been disparaged. The pre-Chicago story argues 
                                                                 
259 Complaint ¶¶ 103-22, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Microsoft VI) (find-
ings of fact), available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm, United States v. Microsoft Corp. 87 F. Supp. 2d 
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that a tie enables monopoly power to be leveraged in the market for the tying good to be lever-
aged to thus enabling a monopoly in the market for a second tied good.
260 By Chicago-school 
lights, such a tie does not help the monopoly, but hurts it.
261 Forcing consumers of a firm’s mo-
nopoly good to buy the tied good reduces the consumers’ choices, depressing demand for the ty-
ing good and reducing the profits from selling it.
262 Any premium that it can charge for the tied 
good must be derived from the price for the tying good, where the monopoly power lies.
263 
Breaking the tie would predictably increase the price of the monopoly good. In this case, a tying 
claim would imply that forcing Microsoft to give up sales of Internet Explorer would lead to an 
increase in the price of Windows.  
If tying for leveraging’s sake reduces profits, then tying must have other rationales. One pos-
sibility is price discrimination.
264 If a shoe monopolist were to tie (so to speak) shoelaces to 
shoes, it could charge more for those who use the shoes more intensively, as measured by how 
many shoelaces they use up. The economic effects of price discrimination are generally ambigu-
ous on both efficiency and equity grounds. Price discrimination tends to raise prices to those 
more willing or able to pay a lot for something, but to cut prices to those less willing or able to 
pay.
265 A tactic that enables price discrimination is not necessarily something that ought to be 
targeted by antitrust law.  
The story is more complicated if there were some reason why breaking the tie would not lead 
Microsoft to raise the price of its operating system. United States v. AT&T was a more compel-
ling case because regulation kept AT&T from raising the price of its regulated telephone service 
after breaking the tie between it and long distance service through the divestiture.
266 While there 
is no regulation of Microsoft, perhaps there are other impediments to raising its operating system 
price if the tie to the browser were broken. Perhaps one might argue that Microsoft might fear 
piracy—unauthorized copying—were it to raise the price of the operating system, but perhaps 
not for browsers. Microsoft might also not have been able to single out browser users to pay 
higher prices. In theory, it might do so by charging more to browser customers for use of the op-
erating system, or to charge more to browser companies for access to the APIs necessary to run 
browsers on Windows. But in practice, it may not be able to segment the market to be able to 
bring this about.  
To put this in economic jargon, the “transaction costs” associated with creating a separate 
market in operating system access for browser users, or in API access for software companies 
that want to write browsers to run on windows, may serve as an implicit price regulator. Such 
market imperfections suggest that Microsoft could effectively increase operating system prices 
and reduce consumer welfare by tying a browser to its operating system. The evidence for this 
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economically valid tying claim would entail showing that Microsoft would not raise the price of 
its operating system were the tie to be broken, because of piracy threats or these transaction 
costs.
267  
Whether such evidence could have been obtained is beyond the scope of this Article.
268 Were 
convincing evidence available, the direct remedy suggested by the underlying economic theory 
would be to break the tie, by allowing developers to write browsers that would run on Windows 
and to allow users to use those browsers. Making the break effective would require that Micro-
soft not be able to charge the monopoly price for access to the operating system. The court could 
make this possible by requiring that Microsoft disclose the APIs at a reasonable price to be set by 
the court. Because Microsoft might favor itself with undisclosed APIs, a court might require Mi-
crosoft to make its source code available for application developers.
269 Developers would not 
have a right to use the source code in their own products, but they could examine it to ensure that 
no secret APIs were present. They might even discover ways of getting the operating system to 
perform certain functions that Microsoft had not anticipated.  
C.  Missed opportunity 2: Refining predation 
Predation, like tying, ended up being part of the plaintiffs’ case, more as a contributor to the 
holistic sense of Microsoft as a bad actor rather than as a “stand alone” ground for liability.
270 
Also, as with tying, Chicago economics has expressed considerable skepticism about preda-
tion.
271 Under this conception, a predatory price causes losses while it is being charged, and 
hence is profitable only if the monopolizing firm can raise the price after its competitors have 
been driven from the market.
272 Once the price is raised, however, entrants will return to the 
market.  
If predation works, it is not as a tactic to drive out present competitors, but as a threat to dis-
courage potential competitors from entering. This threat is generally not credible. Typically, 
once the entrant has entered, the firm has to charge such a low price to get the entrant to write off 
its sunk costs
273 and leave the market that it will be more profitable to let an entrant remain once 
                                                                 
267 Recall that if the proper case against Microsoft were based on the theory in the plaintiffs’ case, breaking the 
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it has entered.
274 If there are no substantial sunk costs associated with entry, then entry cannot be 
readily deterred by a predatory price. Firms can enter, without incurring sunk costs, when the 
price is raised to recoup the losses from predation.
275  
Calling this story into question, and thus re-establishing predatory pricing as a legitimate an-
titrust concern, has been a major achievement of post-Chicago strategic economics.
276 A m o-
nopolist may have a credible predatory threat if entrants think there is some chance that the mo-
nopolist cares more about retaining the monopoly than it does about profits.
277 Essentially, if a 
firm enters, a monopolist may respond with a predatory price, either because it genuinely cares 
more about the monopoly than profits, or because it wants to keep future entrants thinking that it 
does.
278 Perhaps paradoxically, a monopolist may be better able to keep a profitable monopoly if 
it is able to convince potential entrants that it does not care about profits.  
These interesting theories have wanted for applications. The typical large firm has dispersed 
stockholders and management with a fiduciary responsibility to maximize profits and not engage 
in escapades purely designed to protect market share. That’s not to say the theoretical ideal never 
works, but I would expect it to be difficult to build an antitrust case on the grounds that the man-
agement is sufficiently disconnected from the interests of its stockholders to be able to convince 
competitors that the firm would act to protect market share at the expense of profits.  
Microsoft could have been the exception that fit post-Chicago predatory theory. While Mi-
crosoft has dispersed ownership, in many respects it was, in effect, a half-trillion-dollar sole pro-
prietorship, under the control of Bill Gates. The plaintiffs might have been able to generate evi-
dence to support the proposition that Microsoft was the rare company that fit the post-Chicago 
theory of predation.
279 With that theory and evidence, the remedy would be to change Microsoft 
from Gates’s proprietorship to an ordinary dispersed-ownership company, by forcing Gates to 
sell off the vast majority of his interest in the company, but keeping the company itself intact.  
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D.  Missed opportunity 3: The breadth of the monopoly 
A third possibility would be to challenge Microsoft’s monopoly in the operating system di-
rectly. Legally, this might be a stretch, given that Microsoft’s monopoly in its operating system 
seems to be protected by copyright laws.
280 From an economic perspective, however, one may 
question whether the full extent of copyright protection is necessary in this industry. Some com-
mentators have argued that copyright protection against reverse-engineering operating systems or 
their interfaces is undesirable altogether.
281 An operating system may be thought of as an arbi-
trary solution to an obvious problem that had to be done some way, but the particular way it was 
done does not merit protection.
282 Another argument would be that the firm that develops an op-
erating system has a natural “first mover” advantage over those that can provide only copies, and 
thus does not require the extra intellectual property protection.
283 Even if some copyright protec-
tion is worthwhile, it is not clear that the tens of billions of dollars in market capitalization gen-
erated by Windows were necessary to induce investment. The prospect of a mere billion or two 
might suffice. 
A case along these lines under the antitrust laws seems problematic, absent a finding that Mi-
crosoft abused its copyright. Achieving a result on these grounds might require statutory change 
in the copyright laws. If evidence suggests that copyright is unnecessary or that a shorter term 
would suffice, one could justify breaking up Microsoft along horizontal lines, into separate com-
panies, each of which could compete with one another in selling Windows. Such a remedy would 
be functionally equivalent to voiding the copyright or letting others use the source code under a 
mandatory zero-price license.
284  
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E.  Recapping the stories 
We have suggested that the case against Microsoft was not economically consistent inter-
nally, as the theory, evidence, and remedy each fit separate “theory/evidence/remedy” cases. We 
have also identified three other cases that might have been pursued. The table below summarizes 
the list, with the plaintiffs’ case components in lighter type.  
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ing on appeals to the residue of a volunteer ethic that worked in the early days of the Internet but most likely cannot 
sustain commercial initiatives running into the hundreds of millions of dollars.      46
For none of these cases have we supplied evidence that the theory holds or shows that the bene-
fits of the implied remedy exceed possible costs. Still, the list belies a claim that any lack of eco-
nomic consistency in United States v. Microsoft arose because no economic case could be con-
structed. Rather, it indicates that the costs of making such a case were less than the benefits from 
the point of view of one charged with winning a case under the realities of the law and the litiga-
tion process, rather than from the point of view from the ivory tower. 
F.  Not every post-Chicago theory helps: Tipping, standards 
The extent to which one can come up with innovative economics stories to tell against Mi-
crosoft could imply that anything might work. However, not all of the stories used to justify de-
voting special attention to the computer software industry hold up. One such notable story in-
volves “tipping.”
285 “Tipping” refers to the propensity for markets with network externalities, 
such as those for computer operating systems, to become “winner take most,” if not “winner take 
all.”
286 By definition, network externalities imply that all else being equal, consumers would 
rather have the same product that most other consumers have.
287 In such markets, a small early 
advantage that one seller might have, real or perceived, that would lead consumers to think that it 
would have a plurality of sales, could translate into a dominant market share, as everyone wants 
to jump on the same bandwagon. In the limit, the market would fall all the way toward monop-
oly.
288 One might analogize to a coin delicately balanced on its end; if tipped a little bit in one 
direction, it would fall completely in that direction.  
On the one hand, the propensity of a market to “tip” warrants additional antitrust vigilance.
289 
In ordinary markets, a firm might have to do a great deal to strip market share from its competi-
tors. If the market can tip, however, a firm’s tactic that creates what would normally be a rela-
tively small and harmless competitive advantage could, in markets with network externalities, 
deter entry altogether.
290  
On the other hand, in markets prone to tipping, competition will be for the market—which 
firm benefits from the tipping and ends up the monopolist—rather than for competition within 
the market.
291 Interpreting tactics when competition is for the market becomes problematic. Pric-
ing below cost might be predatory in ordinary markets, but will be the expected price early in a 
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tipping-prone market’s development, when the expected result is that the winner will get a mo-
nopoly.
292 Essentially, firms expecting monopoly profits later will compete them away through 
offering below-cost discounts to early adopters.
293  
The most telling way in which tipping tends to make a post-Chicago strategic story hard to 
tell follows from the difference between competition in a market and competition for it. An im-
portant post-Chicago analysis of innovation posits that an incumbent monopolist in a market in 
which intellectual property plays an important role—like computer software—will have a strate-
gic incentive to beat potential entrants in a race to innovate.
294 The key to this and similar theo-
ries of preemptive innovation or exclusionary contracting
295 rests on a distinction between the 
value of entry to the entrant and its cost to the incumbent.
296  
In these models, if the entrant is successful, e.g., gets a patent first, it then competes head-to-
head with the incumbent monopolist, and both reap only the profits they would get under such 
competition.
297 Let PE be the entrant’s profits if it wins the innovation race, and let P IC be the 
incumbent’s profits under competition with the entrant. If the incumbent wins, it gets to keep the 
monopoly and the profits that go with it,
298 which we can label PIM. Because monopoly profits 
are the maximum attainable, the incumbent’s monopoly profits exceed the profits it and the en-
trant would reap were they to compete against each other. Symbolically, 
  PIM > PIC + PE. 
This equation says that the value of winning to the incumbent is the difference between its mo-
nopoly and competitive profits, while the value of winning to the entrant is its post-entry profits. 
It follows that the profits from winning the innovation race are greater for the incumbent than for 
the entrant, i.e.,  
  PIM – PIC > PE.  
Consequently, the incumbent has an incentive to preempt the entrant, patenting too fast just to 
retain its monopoly. 
This strategic argument fails, however, in markets prone to tipping. The models described 
above depend on asymmetry between the entrant, which receives only competitive profits if it 
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innovates, and the incumbent, who gets to keep a monopoly if it innovates.
299 Suppose that be-
cause of tipping, a successful entrant would not only survive but be the next monopolist, driving 
out the incumbent. The entrant would get the monopoly profit and the losing incumbent would 
get nothing. In our notation,  
  PIC = 0  
and 
  PIM = PE. 
The rewards for winning the innovation race are the same for both incumbent and entrant. Tip-
ping eliminates the asymmetry that gives the incumbent a strategic advantage. If markets for 
browsers, operating systems, or application platforms are prone to tipping, it makes it harder, not 
easier, to tell a story by which Microsoft could have discouraged Netscape from competing.
300 
 A related concern is that in a competition in a tipping-prone operating system or browser 
market, the “right” monopoly would not emerge to be the next industry standard.
301 For example, 
standards may last too long because of inertia.
302 Network externalities discourage users from 
departing from the prevailing standard, even if the newer standard would be better for all if all 
adopted it.
303 Standards may also be adopted too easily, if everyone adopts because they expect 
others to switch.
304 The expectations may be rational in the sense of being self-fulfilling, even if 
the original standard had been preferred by all had everyone stayed with it.  
The real-world relevance of these theoretical possibilities continues to be a matter of consid-
erable debate.
305 Even if markets may choose the wrong standard, whether the public sector 
would systematically do a better job is arguable.
306 Even if Microsoft’s operating systems were 
an inferior standard compared to Linux, Macintosh, Netscape plus Java, or anything else, Micro-
soft’s success in the market notwithstanding probably ought not be an antitrust violation purely 
on those grounds.
307  
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VIII.  Beyond an economic case: Holistic patterns, intent 
A.  Holistic approaches 
Another view of the Microsoft case is that the defendant’s guilt is established not as the result 
of a single defined economic story, but as the sum of a number of episodes each of which adds to 
a sense of antitrust culpability.
308 In this conception, the browser story, rather than being central, 
is just one pixel of a larger image. The more important task is to establish a pattern of conduct, 
going beyond the Netscape and Java core concerns. These expansive concerns include accusa-
tions that Microsoft threatened other firms who were thinking of entering its markets, such as 
Intel, Apple, and IBM.
309 It includes the allegation that Microsoft initially attempted to conspire 
with Netscape to divide the personal computer market into subsets over which each would retain 
a monopoly.
310 While this might have been an antitrust violation on its own, it played a role here 
only to corroborate Microsoft’s inclination to resist competition.
311 The same could be said of the 
claims that Microsoft acted in a predatory fashion by giving away Internet Explorer—it was 
characterized not as a specifically illegal act, but as part of a “predacious” pattern.
312  
This reading of Microsoft’s conduct may be effective legally, but it does not follow from an 
economic construction of an antitrust case. The complaint in the case centered on the evidence 
on and effects of impeding Netscape, whether in the narrow terms of browser distribution or in 
the larger, if more vaguely stated, context of monopolizing future application platforms.
313 The 
browser story, however, can hardly be only a component in a larger story if the importance of 
monopolizing browser distribution comes from the expectation of future success as an applica-
tion platform.  
Moreover, a broader, impressionistic approach makes any of the specific economic stories—
the three fitting the theory, evidence, or remedy in the case, or the others listed—harder to tell. 
The nature of economics is to wean litigants away from impressions and to focus on specific evi-
dence to support a specific theory that would, if validated, imply a specific remedy. If the plain-
tiffs and courts in United States v. Microsoft had relied a more expansive, holistic approach, one 
might ask whether such expansion is consistent with the purposes of antitrust. Delineating com-
petitive from anticompetitive conduct and deterring the latter while encouraging the former are 
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better served if defendants know the rationale of an antitrust case before its trial starts.
314 The 
Court of Appeals commendably rejected Judge Jackson’s holding that Microsoft’s “course of 
conduct” was a separate antitrust violation apart from the component claims.
315  
B.  The role of intent in antitrust 
Another possibility is an interpretation of United States v. Microsoft based on intent. One 
commentator has claimed that Microsoft’s intent to monopolize is the basis of its culpability.
316 
This Article is not the place to fully examine of the role of intent in antitrust.
317 From an eco-
nomic perspective, which focuses on effects, an emphasis on intent seems misplaced.  
Economics recognizes a role of intent in some legal settings. In the economic analysis of 
torts, intent is used to differentiate between accidental and purposeful conduct.
318 In the case of 
accidents, the absence of specific intent indicates that the costs of negotiating an agreement be-
tween the tortfeasor and victim ex ante would be prohibitive.
319 These high “transaction costs”
 320 
justify allowing courts to set the price of negligence as an inducement to exercise due care. With 
purposeful conduct, the potential injurer (e.g., car thief) has an identified victim. The transaction 
costs of finding and negotiating with the potential victim, to see if the conduct (e.g., taking the 
victim’s car) would be part of a mutually agreeable bargain, are relatively low.
321 High criminal 
penalties can be used to force potential injurers into the market to negotiate with potential vic-
tims, preventing transfers of wealth that are not mutually beneficial.
322  
This economic rationale for looking at intent in legal settings, however stretched it may be to 
apply to torts, has little purpose in antitrust generally and in this case in particular. In no sense 
could Microsoft’s conduct here, for good or ill, be taken to be accidental. It was never contended 
that one day Microsoft discovered that Windows 95 serendipitously happened to be able to do 
browsing as well.
323 More generally, in business contexts, efforts to acquire market share at the 
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expense of one’s competitors is typical in all but the most textbook-like, atomistic settings.
324 If 
so, attributing guilt to allusions to beating competitors or driving them out of the market would 
probably expose most firms to antitrust liability.  
In this case, the court of appeals held that whether conduct violates § 2 of the Sherman Act is 
based only on the effect of the content.
325 Intent-like statements could be evidence of effect.
326 
One could help verifying one of the above theories by investigating whether Microsoft’s execu-
tives expressed and believed it. But making intent the basis for culpability suggests that a firm 
instituting a practice or structuring itself to lead to anticompetitive effects might be excused from 
antitrust liability if it did not intend to restrain trade or monopolize a market.
327 To hold intent 
itself as the basis for culpability suggests that Microsoft was guilty of a hate crime rather than 
subversion of competition.  
IX.  Conclusions 
We have reviewed the arguments in United States v. Microsoft and discussed the tensions 
and inconsistencies among the theory, central evidence, and remedy in the case. We have also 
reviewed alternative cases that might have been brought and assessed other approaches involving 
holistic patterns of conduct or intent. The review suggests that major antitrust litigation is more 
comfortable with economics as a peripheral player than with the careful refinement necessary to 
build an economically consistent case from theory through evidence to remedy. That the Micro-
soft case could be viewed as a traditional case, along with its success (subject to appeals), is ex-
actly the problem. The success shows that it is easier and more rewarding to revert to traditional 
approaches than to engage in the complicated and problematic tasks necessary to show that inno-
vative, post-Chicago theories could and should apply. Reliance on holistic impressions and intent 
further indicates a pre-Chicago reversion of the role of economics in antitrust policy.  
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One could celebrate rather than regret that economics, or policy analysis apart from legal 
considerations, may be losing a twenty-five year effort to take a major role in constraining the 
implementation of the antitrust laws. Whether one regards this as shedding the shackles of Chi-
cago economics or reverting to the era when economics did not matter, the cat may be irretrieva-
bly out of the bag. There may be nothing a court of appeals or the Supreme Court could or 
should do to turn back the clock to an era where simpler but more robust economic theory was a 
useful contributor to antitrust practice and policy. The appellate courts in United States v. Micro-
soft might have issued a substantive ruling to force the remedy to be tied to the theory and evi-
dence in the case. They could have intervened more deeply and reverse all or part of the trial 
court’s findings to reduce tensions and inconsistencies identified above. So far, however, those 
tensions remain largely in place.
328  
If the root cause of the reduced role of economics is that antitrust precedent and litigation 
process make antitrust trials a poor venue for getting the economics right, the alternatives may be 
even worse. It is far from obvious that other institutions—the executive branch, a regulatory 
agency, or Congress—would be more effective venues. Perhaps specialized courts, with judges 
specifically appointed on the basis of expertise in antitrust law and economics, would be help-
ful.
329 Ultimately, uncertainty about whether any institution could rectify the situation, rather 
than the substance of Microsoft’s conduct, may be the best reason for having left this matter to 
the market. 
Regarding remedies, we have identified many that could have been imposed, depending on 
which theory would best be supported by available evidence. The identified remedies, in addition 
to the proposed remedy (structured around a different case), included: 
•  limiting Microsoft’s ability to provide browsing 
•  eliminating some of its exclusionary contracts with OEMs or ISPs 
•  providing equal access at reasonable terms to APIs, perhaps through publishing Windows 
source code 
•  forcing Bill Gates to divest his stock in Microsoft 
•  reducing copyright protection, perhaps through horizontal divestiture. 
Suggesting which theories would be best supported by the evidence and lead to the most benefi-
cial remedies has been beyond the scope of this Article. All of these may be problematic. Per-
haps the best alternative would be to follow Lawrence White’s suggestion and simply impose a 
hefty fine on Microsoft, assuming one has concluded that it acted illegally, in the $10 billion 
range, to deter similar conduct by it and others in the future.
330 
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We conclude by observing that antitrust is not the only area subject to the possibility that 
progress in economic theory could lead to regress in economic policies. International trade the-
ory is undergoing a similar conflict between academic progress and policy application. In a pre-
economic era, free trade was dominated by protectionist and mercantilist beliefs that the purpose 
of trade was to sell exports but to limit imports.
331 Neoclassical economics, akin to Chicago-
school antitrust, displaced this perspective with a view that international trade, like domestic 
trade, makes both countries wealthier and should be promoted.
332 In recent years, strategic trade 
theory has identified circumstances in which trade protections could benefit a country, much as 
post-Chicago industrial organization has identified special cases in which trade barriers, such as 
quotas or tariffs, can benefit a nation.
333 Reacting to the use of that theory to rekindle protection-
ist opposition to trade, the major contributor to that literature, Paul Krugman, has become a stri-
dent opponent to what he sees as their inappropriate use in justifying a general reaction against 
international trade.
334  
One has or can expect to see similar effects in other policy areas, such as environmental 
protection
335 or minimum wage laws.
336 Whether advances in economics lead to advances in 
public policy, or simply reduce social science to part of the cannon fodder for advocates, is thus 
a wider and more pressing question than even an antitrust case as prominent as United States v. 
Microsoft would indicate. Encouraging real world institutions, with all of their limitations and 
imperfections, to use sophisticated social science as a means to promote the general welfare 
rather than as an excuse to indulge in naïve predilections or to favor special interests, will be a 
challenge for all concerned with the aims of policy, regulation, and law.  
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Epilogue 
A.  Events since the Court of Appeals decision 
As ordered by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the remanded case returned to a dif-
ferent judge.
337 On August 28
th, 2001, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ordered the parties in the 
case to file by September 14
th a “Joint Status Report” to identify the issues for the court’s resolu-
tion, the extent of discovery remaining, and further litigation foreseen.
338 Prior to the filing of the 
Joint Status Report, the Department of Justice notified Microsoft on September 6th that it would 
neither pursue the divestiture remedy that the court of appeals had vacated nor litigate a “tying” 
count that the court of appeals had reversed and remanded.
339 In a Joint Status Report filed on 
September 20
th, the parties agreed that the sole issue remaining for litigation was an injunctive, 
conduct-based remedy pursuant to the monopolization count upheld by court of appeals.
340 
A week after the Joint Status Report was submitted, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered the parties 
to attempt to negotiate a settlement by November 2, 2001,
341 with the expectation that they 
would “engage in an all-out effort . . . meeting seven days a week and around the clock”
342 The 
judge’s interests in a rapid settlement were the benefits “in light of the recent tragic events affect-
ing our Nation” following the September 11 attacks, to minimize further litigation expense and 
delay after the case had gone on for four years, “an eternity in the computer industry.”
343 If the 
parties had not reached a settlement by October 12
th, she would appoint a mediator.
344 While set-
tlement talks ensued, the Supreme Court on October 9 denied without comment Microsoft’s ap-
peal of the court of appeals ruling.
345  The same day, New Mexico withdrew from the case.
346 On 
October 12
th, the parties had not yet reached a settlement, but satisfied with their diligence, the 
judge accepted their proposal offering Professor Eric Green of the Boston University School of 
Law as a mediator.
347 
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On Friday November 2
nd, Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s deadline, the Department of Justice and 
Microsoft announced that they had reached a settlement agreement.
348 The following Monday, 
nine of the remaining eighteen states signed on to the settlement, with minor modifications.
349 
Two days later, on November 8
th, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered that the proceedings continue on 
two “tracks.”
350 “Track I” would be a review of the proposed settlement under the Tunney 
Act.
351 As part of that track, the Department of Justice published the proposed Final Judgment 
and Competitive Impact Statement in the Federal Register on November 28
th, 2001.
352 “Track II” 
involves continuation of the litigation between Microsoft and the nine state plaintiffs who did not 
agree to the settlement; the judge scheduled a pre-hearing conference for March 4, 2002.
353 
Those state plaintiffs filed their proposed remedy on December 7, 2001.
354  
B.  The proposed decrees  
The DOJ-Microsoft Settlement would last five years after entered by the Court.
355 Its key 
provisions are: 
•  Microsoft would be prohibited from retaliating against personal computer manufacturers 
(OEMs) and independent software or hardware vendors that use or ship computers with 
non-Microsoft software, including computers that run more than one operating system.
356 
•  Microsoft would have to offer operating system licenses to OEMs on uniform terms and 
conditions, although royalties can reflect “reasonable volume discounts” and the costs of 
marketing programs available to all OEMs.
357 
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•  Subject to some nondiscrimination limitations, OEMs would be free to place icons for 
competing software in the Windows “Start Menu” (listing available programs) or desk-
top.
358 They would also be free to have competing programs start automatically when a 
computer is turned on or the Internet is accessed, if a Microsoft product “would otherwise 
be launched automatically.”
359 
•  Microsoft would be required to disclose to all software and hardware vendors the applica-
tion program interfaces and communication protocols used by its applications to work 
with Windows operating systems.
 360 
•  End users would be allowed to remove icons for Microsoft middleware from the Start 
Menu or desktop, and to designate non-Microsoft middleware as the default when Micro-
soft products would otherwise be started automatically.
361 
•  Microsoft would not be able to enter into exclusive distribution agreements with hard-
ware or software vendors.
362 It also could not enter into contracts to distribute a fixed 
percentage of Microsoft operating systems or middleware
363 unless Microsoft shows “it is 
commercially practicable for the entity  to provide equal or greater distribution, promo-
tion, use or support for software that competes with” such software.
364 
•  Microsoft would have to license, on “reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms, what-
ever intellectual property is necessary to carry any of these options.
365  
Microsoft need not disclose APIs or protocols that compromise anti-piracy, anti-virus, or 
other security-related systems unless the recipient has no record of violating intellectual property 
rights, has a reasonable business need for the API, and agrees to let Microsoft-approved third 
parties verify compliance with Microsoft specifications that ensure “proper operating and integ-
rity” of these systems.
366 Microsoft can also keep OEMs from displaying icons or automatically 
starting software that has “a user interface of similar size and shape to the user interface dis-
played by the corresponding” Microsoft middleware.
367 Microsoft’s operating system may 
launch Microsoft software if the use involves a server maintained by Microsoft or the competing 
software fails “to supply the end user with functionality consistent with a Windows Operating 
System Product,” as long as the reasons are disclosed “in a reasonably prompt manner.”
368 
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To enforce the decree, the plaintiffs will have continuing rights of access to Microsoft docu-
ments, correspondence, and code, and can interview Microsoft employees and get written reports 
from Microsoft on matters related to the settlement.
369 The direct enforcement responsibility will 
be vested with a three-person Technical Committee.
370 The Technical Committee will have the 
same rights of access to information as the plaintiffs, and will provide written compliance reports 
every six months.
371 The Committee’s most important role is as the vehicle for investigating 
complaints from third parties and proposing responses to those it deems worthwhile. The Com-
mittee’s “work product, findings or recommendations” are not to be admissible in any court pro-
ceeding, however, and Committee members may not testify on any settlement-related matter.
372 
If a court does find that Microsoft has “engaged in a pattern of willful and systematic violations,” 
the plaintiffs can ask for a two-year extension of the decree and “other relief as the Court may 
deem appropriate.”
373 
The nine state plaintiffs that continue to litigate would add to the DOJ-Microsoft Settlement 
certain requirements that would bind Microsoft for ten years (instead of five).
374 Such require-
ments include: 
•  Offering versions of its operating system that do not include middleware, at a discount 
equal to “the ratio of the development costs of each omitted Microsoft Middleware Prod-
uct to the relative development costs of that version of the Windows Operating System 
Product”;
375 
•  Continuing to provide older versions of its operating systems after it introduces new ones, 
at a license fee “no more than the lowest royalty paid” by a licensee prior to that 
introduction;
376  
•  Disclosing and licensing at a zero price and without restrictions the source code for Inter-
net Explorer and other browser products;
377 
•  Bundling the industry-standard version of Java free of charge with all copies of Windows 
operating systems.
378 
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•  Auctioning off to three independent providers licenses to develop versions of Office that 
run on non-Windows operating systems, including rights to all Office and Windows 
source code necessary to achieve portability.
379  
The litigating states also recommend changes in the procedures for enforcing the settlement. 
It would replace the Technical Committee, as described above in the settlement filed by the other 
parties,
380 with a court-appointed Special Master. This Special Master would have the right to 
hold hearings and file reports directly to the court, which the court could then use (along with 
acting on its own volition) to institute further proceedings against Microsoft.
381 Unlike the work 
of the Technical Committee in the alternative proposal, the work of the Special Master would be 
admissible in court.
382 If the court finds a “knowing act of material non-compliance” with this 
settlement, it may, among other things, force Microsoft to license the source code for the soft-
ware “implicated” in this act.
383 A “pattern or practice of material non-compliance” could lead to 
civil penalties and further conduct remedies.”
384 These go beyond the penalty in the DOJ-
Microsoft settlement that envisions a penalty of extending the decree two years beyond its origi-
nal five-year term.
385 
C.  Assessment 
Our purpose in this Article has not been to evaluate the legal merits of the antitrust case 
against Microsoft. Rather, it has been to ascertain any lessons it might offer regarding the need 
that cases follow an economic framework in which a theory implies a set of confirming evidence 
that, if obtained, would imply a particular remedy.
386 
It is most useful to reverse the order in which we evaluated the case above, and begin with 
the remedy, followed by the theory, and ending with the evidence. The relief plan that was ini-
tially won at trial was a vertical breakup of Microsoft into two firms, one providing operating 
systems and the other providing everything else.
387 The court of appeals vacated that divestiture, 
largely because the trial judge failed to hold hearings and exhibited a potential lack of impartial-
ity.
388  
The Department of Justice elected not to pursue the breakup, and that remedy no longer re-
mains in either its settlement with Microsoft or that of the states that seek stronger sanctions. In 
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its September 6, 2001 press release announcing the decision, the Department said that it would 
not pursue the divestiture (nor antitrust liability for tying the browser to the operating system) “in 
an effort to obtain prompt, effective and certain relief for consumers,”
 389 and that its decision 
was made “in light of the Court of Appeals opinion.”
 390 The Department’s Competitive Impact 
Statement only repeats these statements with no further elaboration.
391 
These reasons are undeniably valid, but they are not obviously compelling. The court of ap-
peals vacated the order largely on procedural grounds.
392 It did state that divestitures are costly 
and that hearings would be required to determine that the benefits of a breakup would outweigh 
those costs.
393 Those findings, however, could fairly be read as justifications for the court’s deci-
sion that hearings are necessary. That pushing for a divestiture would tend to extend the proceed-
ings, creating delay and uncertainty, should also not have come as a surprise. One might believe, 
as Judge Kollar-Kotelly expressed, that the attacks of September 11, 2001 increased the impor-
tance of expediting the resolution of this case,
394 but the Department notified Microsoft that it 
was electing not to pursue a divestiture on September 6, 2001.
395  Perhaps the Department 
reached the conclusion expressed in this Article that the vertical breakup was at best poorly con-
nected to either the theory of this case or the evidence presented during the trial, but that would 
be utter speculation. 
The litigating states’ proposal retains some aspects of the original remedy, in requiring that 
Microsoft allow independent software vendors to develop versions of Office that would run on 
non-Windows operating systems.
396 The basis for the recommendation, made earlier by the 
plaintiffs in support of the breakup, is that new versions of Office would mitigate “application 
lock-in” that discourages consumers from switching operating systems.”
397 The litigating states’ 
proposal, however, cannot change the fact that the record in the case was about Windows, not 
Office, as the source of relevant monopoly power, nor that “application lock-in” applies to all 
applications that run on Windows, not just those provided by Microsoft.
398  
The theory of the case, that (as we put it here) Microsoft acted to enhance its ability to mo-
nopolize future markets in applications platforms,
399 also is not reflected well in the DOJ-
Microsoft Settlement. The key provisions of that settlement mostly deal with preserving rights of 
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personal computer makers, software vendors, Internet service providers, and consumers to use 
other operating systems or middleware that competes with Microsoft without penalty. Browsing, 
the alleged threat to the Windows operating system, is but a subset of middleware.
400 As with the 
remedy proposal, it is given no special status in this proposed settlement.
401 If monopolization of 
future application platforms were the justification for these restrictions, one would need to show 
that the other forms of middleware were also nascent competitors in that market—a showing that 
has not been made.
402 In addition, if these other middleware services are also routes into which 
new operating system competitors may develop, the ground for a monopolization case in which 
Netscape was the target shrinks if not disappears.
403 If all middleware is significant, eliminating 
one particular form would have little if any effect on the degree to which Microsoft’s alleged 
elimination of Netscape would allow it to preserve and extend its dominance in operating sys-
tems. 
The litigating states’ proposal shares this failure to discriminate between middleware that 
would threaten Microsoft’s future dominance of application platform markets and middleware 
that would not—with two significant exceptions. The first is that its proposal would require that 
Microsoft bundle the latest version of Java, the complement to browsers that allows them to run 
applications on any operating system.
404 Even more important, the litigating states would require 
that Microsoft essentially give away the source code for Internet Explorer and other browser 
products.
405 As those states say, not only would this strip Microsoft of its allegedly ill-gotten 
gains achieved through its attacks on Netscape, but it would enable other software companies to 
develop browser-based platforms for Internet-delivered applications, which might make competi-
tive inroads against Microsoft’s dominance of the desktop.
406 One might doubt whether the case 
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at trial articulated the theory and developed evidence necessary to support this claim,
407 but these 
aspects of the proposed remedy, unlike the remedy proposed at trial, at least fit that theory.
408  
This brings us to the economic picture of the case most consistent with the evidence, that Mi-
crosoft effectively monopolized browser distribution.
409 As noted above, virtually all of the DOJ-
Microsoft Settlement and most of the litigating states’ proposal deals with impediments to the 
use and distribution of competing middleware.
410 Although that concern is not well tied to the 
monopolization of application platforms (or, as unfortunately put, maintaining a monopoly in 
“Intel-based PC operating systems”
411), it is well tied to a claim that monopolizing outlets for 
distributing browsers also monopolizes outlets for distributing middleware generally. If that is 
factually the case—we do not here claim that it is or is not—a broad concern with preserving op-
portunities for competing middleware suppliers to distribute their products is justified.
412 But 
such a theory stands independently of whether or not Microsoft successfully preempted potential 
competition in future application platforms.
413 It would be ironic, to say the least, if the end re-
sult of this lengthy and prominent antitrust case ends up to be about the mundane concern that 
Microsoft monopolized markets in channels for software distribution. 
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